Opinion
No. 05-19-00060-CV
05-20-2020
JOSE AGUILAR, Appellant v. DAN WILLEMS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-18-03480-A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Whitehill, and Nowell
Opinion by Justice Whitehill
This is an eviction case. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded possession of the premises to appellee Dan Willems. Jose Aguilar appealed, raising three issues. We affirm, principally because Aguilar did not bring forward a reporter's record. Without a reporter's record we must in this case assume that the record supports the trial court's judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
We ordered this appeal submitted without a reporter's record because Aguilar failed to provide a reporter's record after notice. See TEX. R APP. P. 37.3(c). Thus, we draw the facts solely from the clerk's record.
Willems sued Aguilar and all other occupants of a certain property in Garland, Texas, in justice court for eviction. Aguilar did not appear in that case, and the justice court rendered a judgment for Willems.
Aguilar then appealed to the county court at law and filed a plea in abatement, plea to the jurisdiction, and original answer.
After a de novo bench trial, the trial judge signed a judgment awarding Willems possession of the property, from which Aguilar appealed.
Aguilar's three issues share a common core premise that his April 3, 2018 pre-foreclosure sale temporary restraining order means that the subsequent sale to Willems was invalid and, thus, Willems lacked a right of possession superior to Aguilar. But what the record doesn't reflect is whether there was evidence that negated that premise.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Issue One: Did the trial court err in ruling for Willems because Willems failed to prove a proper presuit demand for possession?
Aguilar's first issue fails because he did not bring forward a reporter's record, which might explain what led the trial court to its judgment.
Aguilar argues (i) a forcible detainer plaintiff must prove that a person entitled to possession made a presuit demand for the property, (ii) Willems made demand on Aguilar, but (iii) Willems relied on a substitute trustee's deed that was executed in violation of a temporary restraining order issued in a different lawsuit. Therefore, Aguilar concludes, Willems wasn't a person entitled to possession, and his presuit demand for possession was invalid.
When an appellant fails to bring forward a reporter's record, the appellate court must presume the evidence presented was sufficient to support the trial court's judgment. Willms v. Americas Tire Co., Inc., 190 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied); see also Vasquez v. Firebird SFE I, LLC, No. 05-19-00057-CV, 2020 WL 2059913, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 29, 2020, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Favaloro v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 994 S.W.2d 815, 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. struck) ("If the appellant has failed to bring forward a complete record, the points of error dependent on the state of the evidence will be deemed to have been waived.").
Here, a reporter's record is necessary for us to review the factual premise underlying Aguilar's first issue—that without another possible justification supporting the judgment Willems's only claim to a right of possession was a deed executed contrary to a temporary restraining order.
Furthermore, although Aguilar attached to his brief a document that he asserts is a copy of the restraining order, we cannot consider documents not formally included in the appellate record. See Vasquez, 2020 WL 2059913, at *2.
We overrule Aguilar's first issue.
B. Issue Two: Did the trial court err in ruling for Willems because he lacked standing?
No. Aguilar's second issue fails because (i) he didn't provide a reporter's record and (ii) Willems adequately pled standing.
Aguilar again contends that Willems lacked standing because his deed violated a temporary restraining order. Aguilar asserts that he raised the defect in his plea in abatement and in his new trial motion.
To the extent Aguilar's second issue is based on the facts, the absence of a reporter's record again defeats his argument. Even standing is presumed against the appellant absent a reporter's record. Lyons v. Polymathic Props., Inc., No. 05-15-00408-CV, 2016 WL 3564210, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Aguilar also complains that the purported standing defect means that Willems's pleading was not one on which relief could be granted. He further asserts that Willems mentioned the temporary restraining order in a pretrial motion.
Construing Aguilar's complaint as attacking Willems's petition's sufficiency, we disagree. Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. Regarding subject-matter jurisdiction, we construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor, take all factual allegations as true, and look to his intent. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Rangel, No. 18-0721, 2020 WL 596876, at *4 (Tex. Feb. 7, 2020).
Here, Willems alleged, "[T]he tenant breached his agreement by failure to move. Property was foreclosed on. I bought it." And Willems's motion that mentioned the temporary restraining order said nothing implying that the sale to him violated that order. We conclude Willems sufficiently pled standing facts. See Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 249 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) ("A person has standing to sue when he is personally aggrieved by the alleged wrong.").
We overrule Aguilar's second issue.
C. Issue Three: Did the trial court err in ruling for Willems because there were apparent title defects?
No; the absence of a reporter's record precludes Aguilar's argument.
Aguilar contends that Willems's deed was executed in violation of the temporary restraining order, thereby creating an apparent "conflict regarding title" defeating the trial court's jurisdiction. Although he purports to cite exhibits in volume three of the reporter's record in support, there is no reporter's record in this case. Without a reporter's record, Aguilar can't show that the trial evidence raised a title conflict.
Moreover, a title dispute of some sort does not automatically deprive a justice court or county court at law of jurisdiction over a forcible detainer action. See Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 713 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). It is only when the court must determine title issues to determine possession that the court lacks jurisdiction over a forcible detainer case. Id. In Rice, we detailed the trial evidence that allowed the county court to adjudicate possession without determining title, despite the defendants' claim that the trustee's deed was invalid. Id. at 711. Without a reporter's record, we can't tell whether similar evidence was admitted in this case.
We overrule Aguilar's third issue.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
/Bill Whitehill/
BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE 190060F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-18-03480-A.
Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill. Justices Bridges and Nowell participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee Dan Willems recover his costs of this appeal from appellant Jose Aguilar. Judgment entered May 20, 2020.