Opinion
NUMBER 13-16-00568-CV
02-01-2018
JESUS GUEVARA AGUILAR, Appellant, v. ANDREA ROCHA LOZANO, Appellee.
On appeal from the 357th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
Appellant Jesus Guevera Aguilar filed a suit to partition real property. By two issues, which we treat as one, Aguilar argues the trial court erred in granting a no-evidence summary judgment in favor of appellee Andrea Rocha Lozano. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Aguilar and Lozano dissolved their marriage in 2004. Following the divorce, Lozano purchased unimproved land located in Brownsville, Texas (the property). Aguilar later filed a suit to partition the property, alleging that he "built and paid for a residential home" on the property and that he and Lozano lived there "as a couple." Aguilar maintained that, while Lozano owned the land at issue, he owned the improvements on the property and that he was entitled to an equitable partition.
Lozano filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment in which she argued that Aguilar could present no evidence of an ownership interest in the property, and therefore, he could not establish an essential element of his partition claim. Lozano's motion also sought summary judgment on the basis of multiple affirmative defenses. Aguilar filed a response to the motion supported by invoices and receipts depicting various hardware purchases relating to construction of the house.
The trial court granted Lozano's no-evidence summary judgment. This appeal followed.
II. NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A no-evidence summary judgment motion is essentially a motion for a pretrial directed verdict. Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i)); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581-82 (Tex. 2006). A party without the burden of proof may, without presenting evidence, seek summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to support one or more essential element of the non-movant's claim or defense. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). The trial court must grant the motion unless the non-movant produces summary judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. Timpte Indus., Inc., 286 S.W.3d at 310. A genuine issue of material fact is raised if the non-movant produces more than a scintilla of evidence regarding the challenged element. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003).
We review a no-evidence summary judgment using a legal sufficiency standard. Id. "We review the evidence presented by the motion and response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not." Tamez, 206 S.W.3d at 582. "[W]e accept the non-movant's evidence as true and 'indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the non-movant's favor.'" Strandberg v. Spectrum Office Bldg., 293 S.W.3d 736, 738 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (quoting Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. 2004)).
III. PARTITION
By his sole issue, Aguilar argues that the trial court erred in granting a no-evidence summary judgment because he "presented more than a scintilla of evidence that he has an interest in the property to be partitioned" and Lozano's affirmative defenses are not proper bases for the granting of a no-evidence summary judgment.
A. Applicable Law
A joint owner or claimant of real property or an interest in real property may compel a partition of the interest or the property among the joint owners or claimants. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.001 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). When the right to partition is invoked, the trial court must determine the interest owned by each owner, any questions of law or equity, and whether the property is susceptible to partition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 760, 761. The prerequisites of maintaining a suit for partition of land are (1) a common interest in the land, and (2) the equal right to present possession. Manchaca v. Martinez, 148 S.W.2d 391, 391 (Tex. 1941); Trevino v. Trevino, 64 S.W.3d 166, 171 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.); Savell v. Savell, 837 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). Accordingly, an owner of a nonpossessory interest can neither compel nor defeat a partition. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1982, writ ref'd); see Bradley v. Bradley, 540 S.W.2d 504, 515 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1976, no writ) (concluding that the trial court did not err in denying a partition claim where the claimant owned only a nonpossessory interest in the land).
B. Analysis
Lozano's no-evidence motion for summary judgment challenged whether Aguilar could present any evidence that he was a joint owner of the property, an essential element of Aguilar's partition action. Aguilar argues that the "receipts and or invoices for parts, materials, and labor of the improvements on the property" constitute evidence of his ownership interest. We disagree.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Aguilar, the summary-judgment record establishes only that Aguilar made contributions to building a house on the real property he seeks to partition. It is undisputed that Lozano was the sole owner of the land. Under certain circumstances, a person who makes improvements upon property he does not own may be entitled to compensation for the improvements to the extent they have enhanced the value of the property. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 426 (Tex. 2008) (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Kemp, 951 F.2d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 1992); Sharp v. Stacy, 535 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Tex. 1976)); Whelan v. Killingsworth, 537 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ). However, this equitable principle, known as the rule of betterments, provides only for a claim of restitution; it does not create an ownership interest in the property. See Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 426 n.28. Rather, absent evidence of a contrary intent, improvements become part of the land and belong to the landowner. See Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Signature Flight Support Corp., 140 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (explaining that the general rule is not applicable where there is (1) an understanding between the parties that the improvements not become permanently annexed to the land, or (2) evidence showing intent of the improver that the improvements remain personalty with the right to be removed).
To qualify as a good faith improver under the equitable rule of betterments, a person must show that he believed he was the true owner of the land and that he had reasonable grounds for that belief. Miller v. Gasaway, 514 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1974, no writ). Knowledge of a superior interest in the land destroys an equitable claim for restitution. Id.; see Blanar v. Blanar, 598 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In his petition, Aguilar does not claim that he believed he was the true owner of the land when he built the house on the property. Rather, he acknowledges that Lozano purchased the land while the two were living together following their divorce.
Aguilar failed to present any evidence that the house was intended to be anything other than a permanent improvement. See id.; Cleveland v. Milner, 170 S.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Tex. 1943) (concluding that in the absence of evidence of an understanding that a house should not become permanently annexed to the land or that it remain personalty, the house became part of the realty and the owners of the lot became owners of the house). Therefore, Aguilar's contributions to improvements on the property do not constitute evidence that he jointly owned the property with Lozano. See Manchaca, 148 S.W.2d at 391; Trevino, 64 S.W.3d at 171. Because there is no evidence to support an essential element of Aguilar's partition claim, the trial court did not err in granting a no-evidence summary judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Timpte Indus., Inc., 286 S.W.3d at 310. We overrule Aguilar's sole issue.
We note that the record indicates Lozano sold the property during the course of the litigation. In his appellate brief, Aguilar does not address the effect of the sale on his pending partition action, except to generally allege he is entitled to a portion of the proceeds. Because we have concluded that Aguilar presented no evidence of an essential element of his claim, we need not address the impact of the sale. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. We also decline to address Aguilar's alternative argument that that the trial court erroneously granted a no-evidence summary judgment on the basis of Lozano's affirmative defenses because it is not necessary to the final disposition of this appeal. See id.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice Delivered and filed the 1st day of February, 2018.