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concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action with prejudice because the complaint's allegations were "vague, confusing, and failed to tie defendants to specific claims."
Summary of this case from Agha-Khan v. Bank of Am.Opinion
No. 15-55976
03-20-2017
SALMA AGHA-KHAN, M.D., AKA Salma H. Agha, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRUCE BREITMAN, an individual; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-03490-FMO-CW MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Salma Agha-Khan, a.k.a. Salma H. Agha, appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of her Chapter 7 bankruptcy. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Agha-Khan's action for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the allegations in the second amended complaint are vague, confusing and failed to tie individual defendants to specific claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179-80 (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's complaint because it failed to set forth simple, concise and direct averments).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Agha-Khan's second amended complaint without leave to amend because Agha-Khan was provided with two opportunities to amend and further amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile); see also Chodos v. West Publ'g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]hen a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly broad." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as unsupported by the record Agha-Khan's contentions regarding default.
We reject as without merit Agha-Khan's various contentions about judicial bias and allegedly fraudulent docket entries in this case and in her bankruptcy proceedings.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Agha-Khan's motion for leave to file a substitute reply brief (Docket Entry No. 53) is granted. The Clerk shall file the reply brief submitted at Docket Entry No. 52, and strike the reply briefs filed at Docket Entry Nos. 31 and 47. All other pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.