Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC413423, Ruth Kwan, Judge.
Reed Smith, Henry C. Wang, and Zareh A. Jaltorossian for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Weintraub Genshla Chediak and Laurence M. Berman for Defendants and Respondents TeleTech Holdings, Inc., and TeleTech Services, Inc.; Weintraub Genshla Chediak and Charles L. Post for Defendants and Respondents Richard Bledsoe, James Coyle, James Charles, Francisco de la Torre, and Donald Waskiewicz.
SUZUKAWA, J.
In this employee raiding and trade secret action, the opposing corporate parties are competitors in the business process outsourcing industry. Both companies are based in the United States and have offices around the world. Plaintiff contends that the defendant company poached several of its key American managerial employees in Manila (employees), who are now working as managerial employees for defendant in Manila. Plaintiff claims that in violation of their confidentiality agreements, the employees removed confidential and proprietary information, documents, and storage devices that are now being used to solicit plaintiff’s customers on defendant’s behalf.
Plaintiff filed suit in Los Angeles, its principal place of business, against the employees and the defendant company (collectively, defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss or stay this action on the ground that the Philippines is a more convenient forum. The trial court stayed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens and plaintiff appealed.
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in staying this action in favor of a trial in the Philippines. Because plaintiff’s principal place of business is in Los Angeles, its choice of forum as a California resident is entitled to great deference even though it has offices around the world. (See Gould, Inc. v. Health Services, Inc. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 687, 693 [the doctrine of forum non conveniens “ordinarily may not be invoked to deprive a resident plaintiff of access to the California courts”] (Gould).) Defendants have ties to this state that make California an appropriate forum. Although the employees worked in the Philippines, they were treated as California employees. Plaintiff paid their California payroll taxes and required them to sign confidentiality agreements containing a California choice of law provision.
California has a strong public interest in providing a forum to resolve disputes between a California employer and its employees arising from the alleged breach of confidentiality agreements governed by California law and alleged violations of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTA) (Civ. Code, § 3426 et seq.) and the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq, ). (See Magnecomp Corp. v. Athene Co. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 526, 539 [by enacting the UTA, California has manifested a strong interest in providing a forum to its residents for causes of action arising from misappropriation of trade secrets].) In comparison, the Philippines has less interest in enforcing California’s agreements and laws. When the relevant public and private interests are balanced under the correct standard, they weigh in favor of retaining this action in California as a matter of law. Accordingly, the order staying this action on the ground of forum non conveniens is reversed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and appellant Aegis USA, Inc. (Aegis) is a Delaware corporation and its principal place of business is in Los Angeles. Defendant and respondent TeleTech Holdings, Inc. (TeleTech) is a Delaware holding company and its principal place of business is in Colorado. The defendant employees who now work for TeleTech in the Philippines are Richard Bledsoe, James Coyle, James Charles, Francisco de la Torre, and Donald Waskiewicz.
When the employees left Aegis, they allegedly removed from Aegis’s premises confidential information, documents, and information storage devices that are now being used to solicit Aegis’s customers on behalf of TeleTech. This allegedly constituted a breach of the confidentiality agreements that the employees had signed as a condition of their employment with Aegis. The confidentiality agreements contained a California choice of law provision.
Aegis filed suit against defendants in Los Angeles County Superior Court for violations of the UTA and UCL, breach of contract, intentional interference with contract, and related claims. Aegis sought injunctive relief and disgorgement of funds under the UCL, monetary damages, punitive damages, and specific performance of contract.
With regard to the alleged breach of the confidentiality agreements, Aegis sued the individual defendants for breach of written contract (seventh cause of action) and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (eighth cause of action). Aegis also sued TeleTech for intentional interference with contractual relationships (fifth cause of action).
I. The Forum Non Conveniens Motion
Defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action on the ground of forum non conveniens, arguing that because the dispute is centered in the Philippines, it belongs there.
Although each defendant filed a separate forum non conveniens motion, each joined in TeleTech’s motion and we therefore refer to them as one motion. In addition, we do not discuss the jurisdictional challenges raised by the individual defendants, which are not at issue on appeal.
Under California’s forum non conveniens doctrine, the trial court engages in a two-step process in which it first determines whether there is a suitable alternative forum and, if so, it then balances the public and private interests in retaining the action in California versus trying it in the alternative forum. (Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 751 (Stangvik).) The defendant has the burden of proof. (Ibid.)
“A forum is suitable if there is jurisdiction and no statute of limitations bar to hearing the case on the merits.” (Chong v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1036-1037 (Chong).) In this case, defendants asserted that the Philippines is a suitable alternative forum because they will submit to its jurisdiction and waive any statute of limitations defense.
As to the relevant public and private interests, defendants contended that they weigh in favor of a trial in the Philippines because: (1) all of the witnesses are located there and it will be difficult if not impossible to compel third party witnesses to testify in Los Angeles; (2) California has little interest in redressing alleged wrongs that occurred in the Philippines; and (3) Aegis allegedly filed a parallel civil action in the Philippines (the Philippine action) that challenges the same alleged employee raiding scheme, and multiple actions could be avoided by trying this case in the Philippines.
As will be explained, however, the Philippine action was not filed by Aegis and none of the parties in this action is involved in the Philippine action.
In opposition, Aegis argued that its choice of forum as a California resident is entitled to great deference. (Citing Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels (1976) 15 Cal.3d 853, 858-859.) It further argued that the Philippines is not a suitable alternative forum and, in any event, the public and private factors weigh in favor of a trial in California.
Aegis sought to rebut the suitability of the alternative forum by invoking the “‘no remedy at all’” exception. (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 753.) “The ‘no remedy at all’ exception applies ‘only in “rare circumstances, ” such as where the alternative forum is a foreign country whose courts are ruled by a dictatorship, so that there is no independent judiciary or due process of law.’ (Shiley Inc. v. Superior Court [(1992)] 4 Cal.App.4th [126, ] 133-134.) ‘This exception has been applied in cases where the proposed alternative forum is in a foreign country that lacks an independent judiciary. [(Id. at p. 134, fn. 4.)] For example, in Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 574 F.Supp. 854, 861, the court held that an alternative forum in Iran was not available since the courts there were administered by Iranian mullahs and the plaintiffs were likely to be shot if they returned to Iran. Similarly in Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc. (D.Del. 1978) 78 F.R.D. 445, 455, the court found that Ecuador was not a suitable forum since it did not have an independent judiciary. Courts controlled by a military junta in Chile were likewise found unsuitable. (Canada Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania, etc. (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 528 F.Supp. 1337, 1342.)’ (Chong[, supra, ] 58 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037.)” (Guimei v. General Electric Co. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 689, 697; Roman v. Liberty University, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 670, 683.)
In support of applying the exception to this case, Aegis cited Canales Martinez v. Dow Chemical Co. (E.D.La. 2002) 219 F.Supp.2d 719, 738-741 (Canales Martinez), in which the court found the Philippines to be an inadequate forum for reasons including corruption and delay. Aegis also cited several newspaper, periodical, and journal articles that discussed corruption and delay in the Philippine courts. However, Aegis provided no expert declaration or testimony explaining the effect that corruption or delay could have if this case were litigated in the Philippines today.
As to the effect of a trial in California on third party witnesses, Aegis argued that because its witnesses are located in California, they are available to testify here. Aegis further argued that because TeleTech’s third party witnesses are employed by a TeleTech entity in the Philippines, they presumably are available to testify in California for TeleTech.
As to the pending Philippine action, Aegis argued that it was irrelevant to the forum non conveniens analysis because “the two cases do not have a single party in common.” Aegis explained that none of the litigants in this case is a party to the Philippine action, which was filed by Aegis’s affiliate, Aegis People Support, Inc., a Philippine corporation, against TeleTech’s affiliate, TeleTech Customer Care Management (Philippines), Inc., a Philippine corporation, and four Philippine citizens. Aegis contended that because the contracts at issue in the Philippine action were executed by Philippine citizens in the Philippines, they were likely to be construed according to Philippine law.
In its reply, defendants objected that Aegis’s articles concerning corruption and delay in the Philippine courts were inadmissible hearsay. Defendants argued that Aegis could not prove the “no remedy at all” exception by relying solely on “hearsay—a collection of periodicals and studies, entirely inadmissible for these purposes.”
In its surreply, Aegis argued that the Philippines would require a “filing fee of approximately 2% of the claimed damages, ” which it claimed was excessive. Based on its estimated damages of $100 million, Aegis argued that the $2 million filing fee demonstrated the inadequacy of a Philippine forum.
II. The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its ruling, the trial court acknowledged that because Aegis’s main office is in Los Angeles, it is a California resident. It also acknowledged that an “‘action by a California resident cannot be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, except under exceptional circumstances.’ (Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1463 (citing Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels[, supra, ] 15 Cal.3d 853) (original emphasis).” Accordingly, the trial court refused to dismiss this action.
However, the trial court quoted Century Indemnity Co. v. Bank of America (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 408, 411 (Century), for the proposition that it “‘has considerably wider discretion to grant stays precisely because under a stay California retains jurisdiction. Even an action brought by a California resident is subject to a stay.’”
The trial court concluded that it was appropriate to stay this action in favor of a trial in the Philippines because: (1) the Philippines is an adequate alternative forum; and (2) on balance, the private and public interests in favor of staying the action for a trial in the Philippines outweigh those in favor of retaining the action in California.
A. Existence of an Adequate Alternative Forum
Given that defendants are amenable to process and will waive any statute of limitations defense, the issue below was whether the “no remedy at all” exception applies to the Philippines. In concluding that it did not apply, the trial court cited other cases that found the Philippines to be a suitable forum. (See Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (9th Cir. 2006) 433 F.3d 1163, 1180, fn. 7.) The court further stated that Aegis had failed to provide any competent evidence to show that the Philippines is not a suitable forum: “‘[I]n order to defeat a forum non conveniens motion, plaintiffs must show more than general allegations of corruption, lack of due process or other factors making an alternative forum unsuitable.’ Guimei v. General Electric Co.[, supra, ] 172 Cal.App.4th 689, 697. Unlike Canales Martinez[, supra, 219 F.Supp.2d 719, ] where the District Court relied on expert witnesses and a report from the U.S. Department of State, plaintiff has failed to submit any competent evidence that indicates the Philippines is an inadequate forum.” (Italics added.)
As to the Philippine filing fee, the court found that it was irrelevant because there was no evidence of Aegis’s inability to pay the fee. The trial court further noted that Aegis could reduce the fee by seeking lesser damages.
B. Balancing Public and Private Interests
After determining that the Philippines is a suitable alternative forum, the trial court weighed the public and private interests in favor of retaining the action in California against those in favor of litigating the action in the Philippines. (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.)
As a preliminary matter, the trial court concluded that Aegis’s choice of forum as a California resident was entitled to no greater weight than any other factor. It stated that “because plaintiff is incorporated in Delaware and conducts business in the Philippines[, ] plaintiff is not entitled to great deference in its choice of forum because it is not solely a resident of California (see Gould, [supra, ] 54 Cal.App.3d 687, 693). Plaintiff’s residency is a factor to consider in applying the forum non conveniens doctrine. See Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels[, supra, ] 15 Cal.3d 853, 860.” (Italics added; internal record references omitted.)
1. Public Interest Factors
According to Stangvik, “[t]he public interest factors include avoidance of overburdening local courts with congested calendars, protecting the interests of potential jurors so that they are not called upon to decide cases in which the local community has little concern, and weighing the competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation.” (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.)
In this case, the trial court found that the following public interests weighed in favor of retaining the action in California: (1) California has a strong interest in providing a forum to its residents for causes of action arising from misappropriation of trade secrets (citing Magnecomp Corp. v. Athene Co., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 539); (2) California has an “interest in providing a forum for some or all of the parties to this action, including plaintiff who is a California resident”; (3) a trial in California would result in “minimal injustice and burden on local courts and taxpayers [because] the individual defendants pay California taxes”; (4) “[t]he parties participating in this action have a relationship to California which imposes upon them an obligation to participate in judicial proceedings in California”; and (5) “California has an interest in enforcing its own laws because of the California choice-of-law provision” in the confidentiality agreements.
On the other hand, the trial court found that the following public interests weighed in favor of trying the case in the Philippines: (1) there is a pending criminal action in the Philippines against defendant Bledsoe arising out of similar allegations; and (2) California jurors have little local interest in the alleged acts that occurred in the Philippines.
The trial court found that the following factors were neutral: (1) the conflict of law rules of each jurisdiction; (2) the enforceability of judgments entered in each jurisdiction; (3) the congestion of court dockets in each jurisdiction; and (4) the pending Philippine action between the parties’ affiliates.
2. Private Interest Factors
According to Stangvik, “[t]he private interest factors are those that make trial and the enforceability of the ensuing judgment expeditious and relatively inexpensive, such as the ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses.” (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.)
In this case, the trial court identified only one private interest that weighed in favor of retaining the action in California—the voluntary attendance of Aegis’s third party witnesses who are located in California. The trial court found that all of the remaining private interests weighed in favor of trying the case in the Philippines: (1) defendants will be substantially disadvantaged by a trial in California because their third party witnesses are located in the Philippines and will not voluntarily testify in California; (2) contrary to Aegis’s assertion that defendants’ disputed email communications are available solely in California, those communications are available in the Philippines; (3) given the location of the witnesses, the witnesses would be less inconvenienced by a trial in the Philippines; and (4) it would be less expensive and more convenient and expeditious to try the case in the Philippines.
C. The Trial Court’s Decision
Starting with the proposition that Aegis’s choice of forum as a California resident is entitled to no greater weight than any other factor, the trial court balanced the relevant public and private interests. It concluded that, on balance, “the interests in favor of trying this case in the Philippines outweigh those against. Therefore, the motions to stay based on forum non conveniens are granted.”
DISCUSSION
“‘The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.’” (Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 577, 580-581.) The forum non conveniens doctrine, which was well established in California common law, was codified in 1969 in Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30. (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 434, 437.) That section provides in relevant part: “When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.”
“The granting or denial of a forum non conveniens motion lies within the court’s sound discretion. (Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 751-752.) A court has exercised its discretion appropriately when ‘the act of the lower tribunal is within the range of options available under governing legal criteria in light of the evidence before the tribunal.’ (Cal-State Business Products & Services, Inc. v. Ricoh (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1666, 1680.) In exercising its discretion, however, the court must bear in mind that the moving party bears the burden of proving that California is an inconvenient forum. (Stangvik, supra, at p. 751.) There thus must be evidence—not merely bald assertions—to support the trial court’s determination. (Bechtel Corp. v. Industrial Indem. Co. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 45, 48.)” (Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 604, 610 (Ford Motor Co.).)
Defendants contend that where the court considers staying, rather than dismissing the action, the rule that “the plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to a ‘strong presumption’ of appropriateness [and] therefore a defendant must demonstrate that California is a ‘seriously inconvenient forum’... is inapplicable.” (Century, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) We disagree. In Century, there were two plaintiffs but only one was a California resident. The court stated that “[c]ertainly the preference is a strong one for Pacific, which is a resident. As to Century, which is incorporated in Pennsylvania that factor is of lesser significance.” (Ibid.) We read Century to mean that although residence in this state is not dispositive, “the preference is a strong one” for Aegis because it is a resident. (Ibid.)
Aegis contends on appeal that the trial court erred in finding the Philippines to be a suitable alternative forum and in weighing the relevant public and private interests. We disagree with the former contention but agree with the latter.
I. The Philippines Is a Suitable Alternative Forum
“‘[A] forum is suitable where an action ‘can be brought, ’ although not necessarily won.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Roulier v. Cannondale (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1186.) “A forum is suitable if there is jurisdiction and no statute of limitations bar to hearing the case on the merits.” (Chong, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1036-1037.) We review the trial court’s determination de novo except for disputed issues of fact, which are subject to the substantial evidence standard of review. (Ibid.; Guimei v. General Electric Co., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 696.)
In this case, defendants stipulated that they are amenable to service of process in the Philippines and will waive any statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, the alternative forum is suitable unless the “no remedy at all” exception applies. (Chong, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1036-1037.)
Aegis contends that the exception applies because “[d]efendants offered no evidence... that the Philippines judicial system will afford Aegis USA a fair opportunity for adjudication of its claims on the merits and a sufficient remedy for the causes of action alleged in the [complaint].” We conclude that Aegis has misstated the allocation of the burden of proof for establishing the exception.
Once the defendant shows that jurisdiction exists in the alternative forum and the action is not barred by the statute of limitations (Chong, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1036-1037; Guimei v. General Electric Co., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 696), the plaintiff must show that the “no remedy at all” exception applies. “[I]n order to defeat a forum non conveniens motion, plaintiffs must show more than general allegations of corruption, lack of due process or other factors making an alternative forum unsuitable.” (Guimei v. General Electric Co., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 697, italics added.)
In this case, Aegis failed to prove the exception because, as stated in the trial court’s ruling, Aegis “failed to submit any competent evidence that indicates the Philippines is an inadequate forum.” (Italics added.) Although Aegis contends for the first time in its reply brief that the trial court never sustained defendants’ hearsay objection to its evidence of corruption and delay, issues that are raised for the first time in a reply brief need not be addressed on appeal. (Schmier v. Supreme Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 873, 881.) In any event, Aegis is incorrect. The sustaining of the hearsay objection was implicit in the trial court’s statement that Aegis “failed to submit any competent evidence that indicates the Philippines is an inadequate forum.” (See People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 609 [hearsay evidence is not competent evidence].)
Aegis relies on Canales Martinez, supra, 219 F.Supp.2d at page 740, in which the Philippines was found to be an inadequate forum. As the Canales Martinez court noted, however, the suitability of an alternative forum must be decided on a case-by-case basis. (Id. at p. 741 [the “Court’s inquiry must of necessity be fact-intensive and individualized, and a change in facts... might also work a different result”].) A significant factor in Canales Martinez was that after six years, no trial date had been set by the Philippine courts in related cases, which indicated that the alternative forum was inadequate. (Ibid.) In this action, however, the record contains no admissible evidence that corruption or delay would hinder a trial of this action in the Philippines.
II. The Public and Private Interests Weigh in Favor of a Trial in California
In California, there exists an overriding policy to provide residents with “an adequate forum for the redress of grievances. (See Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co. [(1967)] 66 Cal.2d [738, ] 742-743.)” (Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 859.) As a California resident, plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to great weight. (Ford Motor Co., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 610 [under California law, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to great weight even though the plaintiff is a nonresident].) “‘[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 610-611.)
In analyzing the trial court’s granting of the forum non conveniens motion in this case, we “must start from the premise that defendants bore the burden of producing sufficient evidence to overcome the strong presumption of appropriateness attending [the resident] plaintiff’s choice of forum. That is, the inquiry is not whether [the Philippines] provides a better forum than does California, but whether California is a seriously inconvenient forum. (Northrop Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co. [(1990)] 220 Cal.App.3d [1553, ] 1561.) Unless defendants met their burden, the trial court necessarily abused its discretion.” (Ford Motor Co., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.)
The trial court acknowledged that Aegis is a California resident but refused to give great weight to its choice of forum, citing Gould, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 687. Gould is clearly distinguishable. The plaintiff, a Delaware corporation that was based in Illinois, received shipments in California of allegedly defective parts that were manufactured by the defendant in Massachusetts. The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of warranty and other related claims in California. The defendant, a Massachusetts company whose sole ties to California consisted of income from the disputed sales, moved to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. In affirming the order staying the action in favor of a trial in Massachusetts, we stated that “in the non-sole resident situation, ‘[w]here the balance [of convenience criteria] does weigh heavily in a defendant’s favor it becomes the court’s duty to apply the doctrine.’ (Great Northern Ry. Co. [v. Superior Court (1970)] 12 Cal.App.3d [105, ] 110.)” (Gould, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 693.)
In reviewing forum non conveniens rulings, it is important to remember that “discretion is exercisable on a case-by-case basis since the factual situations where application of the forum non conveniens doctrine may be invoked[] will present wide variations.” (Gould, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 692.) Accordingly, the statement in Gould regarding “the non-sole resident situation” did not establish an inflexible rule that requires all “non-sole resident” situations to be given the identical weight.
In Dole Food Co. v. Watts (9th Cir.2002) 303 F.3d 1104, 1116 (Dole), the court grappled with the “non-sole resident” language in Gould. The court pointed out that in Gould, the plaintiff’s principal place of business was in Illinois, whereas in Dole, the plaintiff’s principal place of business was in California. Based on this distinction, the court concluded that Gould’s “non-sole resident” analysis was inapplicable to the California-based plaintiff whose choice of forum was entitled to great deference and would “not be disturbed unless the ‘private interest’ and ‘public interest’ factors strongly favor trial in the foreign country.” (Ibid.)
We agree with Dole and similarly distinguish Gould on the ground that Aegis’s principal place of business is in California. We further note that in this case, California has a strong public interest in enforcing trade secret and unfair competition laws that were not at issue in Gould. Moreover, the defendant in Gould did not have the same ties to California that exist in this case. The defendant in Gould was not qualified to do business in California, had no office, sales representative, or property in this state, did not pay California taxes, and had made no contracts in California. (Gould, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 690.) In this case, the trial court recognized that as a result of the defendants’ ties to this state: (1) trying this action in California would impose a “minimal” burden on “local courts and taxpayers [because] the individual defendants pay California taxes”; (2) the parties in this action “have a relationship to California which imposes upon them an obligation to participate in judicial proceedings in California”; and (3) California has an “interest in enforcing its own laws because of the California choice-of-law provision” in the confidentiality agreements that are at issue in this litigation.
Having distinguished Gould, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to give greater weight to Aegis’s choice of forum as a California resident. When we “start from the premise that defendants bore the burden of producing sufficient evidence to overcome the strong presumption of appropriateness attending [the resident] plaintiff’s choice of forum” (Ford Motor Co., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 611), it is plain that the public interests and private interests in favor of retaining this action in California—Aegis’s principal place of business is located in California, defendants have close ties to California, and California has a significant interest in enforcing its statutes and adjudicating contracts governed by California law—outweigh those in favor of transferring this action to the Philippines. (See Magnecomp Corp. v. Athene Co., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 539; Dole, supra, 303 F.3d at p. 1119.)
We assume that some of defendants’ third party witnesses in the Philippines may not voluntarily attend a deposition or trial in California. The trial court found that because defendants’ third party witnesses will not voluntarily testify in California, “[t]his indicates that ease of access and the cost of obtaining the testimony of these and other third-party witnesses may be contentious if this action is litigated in California.”
However, the fact that issues concerning accessibility and cost “may be contentious if this action is litigated in California” does not mean that California is a seriously inconvenient forum. Even assuming that it may be less convenient for defendants to litigate this action in California rather than in the Philippines, it is possible that those issues will be resolved in the future. As one court stated, “‘the same technological progress in communication and transportation[, ] that has increased the flow of commerce between the states and the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents, has simultaneously decreased the burdens inherent in defending a lawsuit in a foreign tribunal.’ (Rice Growers Assn. v. First National Bank [(1985)] 167 Cal.App.3d [559, ] 580.)” (Magnecomp Corp. v. Athene Co., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 540.) On this record, defendants have failed to show that the difficulty, expense, and inconvenience of obtaining the testimony of nonresident witnesses are sufficient “to overcome the strong presumption of appropriateness attending plaintiff’s choice of forum.” (Ford Motor Co., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 611, 618 [because “the factors pertaining to the convenience of the parties and witnesses cannot be weighed appropriately at this juncture, the trial court necessarily abused its discretion in considering” them].)
This case is analogous to the Ford Motor Co. case, in which Division One of this district reversed the dismissal of an action on forum non conveniens grounds. Although this case involves a stay and factors that are similar but not identical to those in Ford Motor Co., we agree with the court’s general reasoning: “To summarize, we start with the presumption that plaintiff’s chosen forum is convenient. The parties’ convenience in this forum also is reflected in the many ‘service of suit’ clauses found in the insurance policies. Given California’s relationship to the underlying facts, the state’s substantial interest in regulating the conduct at issue and the public’s substantial interest in this case, the relationship of the case to the forum also favors California. Moreover, in light of California’s superior ability to decide the case expeditiously, the absence of any disproportionate burden on this state’s courts, the absence of any unfairness in imposing jury duty on a community unrelated to the action and the lack of any possibility of needlessly multiplicitous actions and inconsistent adjudications, considerations of judicial administration also favor California. Finally, party and witness convenience cannot be determined at this juncture. Given the wealth of factors favoring California as a forum, the trial court clearly abused its discretion in granting defendants’ motions and dismissing the instant action.” (Ford Motor Co., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 618.)
When we start with the presumption that Aegis’s choice of forum is convenient, we conclude that in light of the parties’ ties to this state, California’s substantial interest in this case, and the absence of any disproportionate burden on this state’s courts, the relevant interests weigh in favor of retaining this action in California as a matter of law. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants’ motion to stay the action.
DISPOSITION
The order staying the action is reversed. Aegis is to recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P.J., WILLHITE, J.
With regard to the alleged theft of proprietary information, Aegis sued all of the defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets (Civ. Code, § 3426 [third cause of action]), unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 [fourth cause of action]), and interference with prospective economic advantage (sixth cause of action).
In addition, Aegis sued former employee Coyle for breach of fiduciary duty (first cause of action) and, in a related cause of action, sued TeleTech and former employees Bledsoe and de la Torre for aiding and abetting Coyle’s breach of fiduciary duty (second cause of action). Aegis also sued former employee Waskiewicz for the alleged conversion of a Blackberry that contained proprietary information (ninth cause of action).