Opinion
Civil Action No. 9:18-0481-RMG-BM
04-30-2020
Alvin Adkins individually and as Next Friend for J.A, a minor, and Yvonne Bolden Adkins, Plaintiffs, v. Leroy Dinkins, Jeannie Jefferson, Jasper County School District, Jasper County School District Board of Trustees, Ridgeland-Hardeeville High School, Jasper County, Greg Jenkins, Chris Malphrus, Deputy Stacy Loadholt, Deputy Michael Smith, Deputy Vickie Hanley, and Jasper County Sheriff Office, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action was originally filed by the Plaintiffs in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, Jasper County, asserting six causes of action against the named Defendants arising out of the minor Plaintiff's (hereinafter "J.A.") arrest following a student disturbance at the Ridgeland/Hardeville High School on or about January 28, 2016. The Defendants removed this case to federal court on the ground that one of Plaintiffs' six causes of action (specifically, the Fifth Cause of Action) asserts a federal constitutional claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
On November 20, 2019, the Defendants filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. After receiving an extension of time to respond, Plaintiffs filed memoranda in opposition to the Defendants' motions on January 6, 2020, following which the Defendants filed reply memoranda on January 13, 2020 and January 17, 2020, respectively.
The Defendants' motions are now before the Court for disposition.
This case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f), D.S.C. As the Defendants' motions are dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the Court.
Background
As noted, Plaintiffs' claims arise out of a disturbance that occurred at the Ridgeland/Hardeville High School in Jasper County on or about January 28, 2016. According to the allegations of the Complaint, the minor Plaintiff J.A. (a student at Ridgeland/Hardeville High School) was having lunch in the school lunchroom when another student got into a heated argument with a female student at J.A.'s table. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant Leroy Dinkins (a school employee) was present but did nothing to quell the disturbance, so J.A. got up and went to the nearby gym. However, the parties to the confrontation also moved into the gym, where it escalated into a full scale brawl, resulting in the school resource officer (SRO) and other law enforcement having to be called in to stop the fighting. At that point, law enforcement, an athletic coach, as well as Dinkins were all involved in trying to break up the fight, during which Dinkins may have been struck and/or injured.
According to the Complaint, once the fight was eventually stopped, a large number of students were detained in one or more classrooms while Dinkins, the Defendant Jeannie Jefferson (another school employee), and law enforcement determined whom charges were going to be filed against. Plaintiffs allege that J.A. was one of the students detained as a potential suspect since he was in the gym during the melee, but that even though a number of the possible suspects as well as victims indicated that J.A. had nothing to do with the fight, and even though video from the security camera showed that J.A. was not involved in the fight, after Dinkins and Jefferson made "false accusations" against J.A., he was arrested by the Defendants Hanley, Loadholt and Smith (all Jasper County Sheriff's Deputies). J.A. was charged with Engaging in a Riot, Assault and Battery, third degree, Assault and Battery by Mob, and Public Disorderly Conduct, and was incarcerated at the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in Columbia, where as part of his processing he was forced to strip naked and be searched, following which he was held at DJJ for six (6) days before being eventually released. However, Plaintiffs allege that when the charges were referred to the Fourteenth Circuit Solicitor's Office, after that Office reviewed the video tape and evidence it dismissed all charges against J.A.
In the Complaint Plaintiffs assert a state law claim against the law enforcement Defendants for negligence and gross negligence (First Cause of Action), a state law claim for negligence and gross negligence against the school Defendants (Second Cause of Action), a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrage against all of the Defendants (Third Cause of Action), a state law claim for false imprisonment against all of the Defendants (Fourth Cause of Action), a federal constitutional claim pursuant to § 1983 alleging improper search and seizure, excessive force, and a due process violation against the Defendants Dinkins, Jefferson, Loadhold, Smith and Hanley (Fifth Cause of Action), and a state law "necessaries" claim against all of the Defendants (Sixth Cause of Action). Plaintiffs seek actual and consequential damages, as well as punitive damages and related relief. See generally Complaint. However, as part of the current filings before the Court for consideration, the parties state that they have entered into a stipulation agreeing to the dismissal of some of the originally named Defendants (Greg Jenkins, Chris Malphrus, the Jasper Count School District Board of Trustees, Richland/Hardeeville High School, and Jasper County) and that these parties should be dismissed as party Defendants in this case. Further, the stipulation provides that Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrage is also dismissed.
The docket does not reflect the filing of this stipulation. The parties shall file a copy of the stipulation with the Court within ten (10) days of the date of this Report and Recommendation.
Discussion
The remaining Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's remaining claims. Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. The moving party has the burden of proving that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party makes this showing, however, to avoid summary judgment the opposing party must respond to the motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992).
Federal Claim
In their Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants Dinkins, Jefferson, Loadholt, Smith and Hanley deprived J.A. of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, free from excessive and unreasonable force, and his right to be free from deprivation of liberty and injury in violation of his substantive due process rights. As public school employees (Dinkins and Jefferson) and law enforcement officers (Loadholt, Smith and Hanley), these Defendants are all subject to suit for damages under § 1983 in their individual capacities. Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989); Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358, 365 (1991); Goodmon v. Rockefeller, 947 F.2d 1186 (4th Cir. 1991); Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560 (4th Cir. 1977).
Unlawful Seizure. Plaintiffs' claim that J.A. was unlawfully "seized" and arrested states a claim under the Fourth Amendment. Robinson v. Brown, No. 15-387, 2016 WL 4975021 at * 3 (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 2016) [Noting that an individual is "seized" under the Fourth Amendment when there is a termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied]; United States v. Melo, No. 89-5554, 1989 WL 117839 at *1 (4th Cir. 1989) [Fourth Amendment protection is triggered when a person is seized by law enforcement officers]. The Fourth Amendment commands that seizures be reasonable. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). To show that J.A.'s seizure and arrest were not reasonable so as to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiffs' evidence must be sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether J.A.'s arrest was without probable cause. Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996) ["The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from making unreasonable seizures, and seizure of an individual effected without probable cause is unreasonable"]. "Probable cause exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer 'had reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [Plaintiff] had committed or was committing an offense'". United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2012), citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998). Here, after careful review and consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds for the reasons set out hereinbelow that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a genuine issue of fact that J.A. was arrested without probable cause. Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 368 (4th Cir. 2002) [Finding that in assessing the existence of probable cause, courts examine the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest, and that to prove an absence of probable cause a plaintiff must show "facts which made it unjustifiable for a reasonable officer to conclude that [he] was violating [the law]"]; Taylor v. Walters, 81 F.3d 429, 434 (4th Cir. 1996) [same].
While this claim is styled in the Complaint as being a claim for unlawful search and seizure, Plaintiffs have not addressed this claim as a separate "search" claim in their briefs, nor has any evidence to address a "search" claim, or to show that J.A. was subjected to an unlawful "search", been provided. Therefore, the undersigned has only addressed this claim as an unlawful seizure/arrest claim.
First, and irrespective of the question of whether there was probable cause for J.A.'s arrest, there is no evidence that the Defendants Loadholt or Hanley were involved in the decision to arrest and charge J.A. with the cited offenses arising out of the student riot. Deputy Vickie Hanley (who at the time of this event was the supervisor for the Community Action Division with the Sheriff's Department) was not on campus during the altercation, and only arrived when it was over. See Hanley Affidavit, ¶¶ 1 and 3. Deputy Hanley attests (and Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to dispute) that she was not the investigating officer, did not make any determination as to who would be arrested as an adult or detained as a juvenile, nor did she have any input into the charges brought. Id., ¶ 4. J.A.'s testimony with respect to Hanley was Deputy Hanley told a group of students that they were going to DJJ and that when he told Hanley he did not have anything to do with it, she would not listen to him and only responded "Well, what you doing inside here?" See J.A.'s Deposition, pp. 120, 198-199. That is not a basis for liability on this claim. Deputy Hanley attests that after she arrived on the scene she did observe and overhear Dinkins (who was being interviewed by the Defendant Deputy Smith) identify J.A. by name as being actively involved in the student on student altercation that led to serious injuries to two school officials, requiring medical treatment. Id., ¶ ¶ 5-7. Deputy Hanley further attests that when a juvenile is detained, the investigating officer takes the juvenile into custody and meets with the Department of Juvenile Justice Officer, and that it is the DJJ officer (in this case, Officer Boneparte) who decides whether the juvenile is to be released to a parent or guardian or transported to DJJ. Hanley attests that she did not participate in the meeting with the DJJ officer or in completing the juvenile petitions as she was not the officer who was in charge of the investigation, she did not transport any adult or any juvenile to any facility, nor did she participate in any hearing as (again) she was not the officer investigating the incident. See generally, Hanley Affidavit. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to dispute Hanley's sworn statement, or to show that she was in any way responsible for the charges brought against J.A.
The Jasper County Sheriff Office Summary also states that Hanley watched the video with others, but does not indicate that she made any statements or had any participation in deciding who was arrested. See Court Docket No. 68-11, p. 3.
As for the Defendant Stacy Loadholt, she attests that at the time of the student altercation she also was not on campus, but was attending a family court hearing in Beaufort County as part of her duties as a school resource officer on another school matter regarding an unrelated juvenile petition. Deputy Loadholt attests that when she later arrived at the school she learned for the first time about the fight and that various students were being detained and/or were to be taken to the Jasper County Sheriff's office to meet with the DJJ officer on duty. Loadholt attests that she did not do a police report or supplement to the report of Officer Smith, as she was not the investigating officer; she did not make any determinations as to who would be arrested as an adult or detained as a juvenile; nor did she have any input into the charges brought. Rather, Deputy Loadholt attests that her role was limited to transporting the detainees in her patrol car to meet with the DJJ officer and investigating Officer Williams at the police station, and then transporting those individuals to the DJJ once the decision was made by DJJ officials as to whether the detainees were to be released to parents or transported to Columbia. See generally Loadholt Affidavit. J.A. confirmed that he did not see Loadholt until transport time. See J.A.'s Deposition, p. 133. Deputy Loadhold also attests that although she was present at J.A.'s later school disciplinary hearing, her testimony was limited to explaining that she was not on campus when the events arose, was not the responding officer, and performed no investigation, but simply transported J.A. to DJJ after he had been detained on charges. See Loadholt Affidavit, ¶ ¶ 5-7, 10.
Again, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to call into dispute any of Loadholt's sworn testimony as to her role in these events. Plaintiffs submitted a Jasper County Sheriff's Office Detail completed by Loadholt, in which she states that she and Deputy Smith "responded to a disturbance" and was called to the main office to assist with controlling the crowd. She then lists that five suspects (including the Plaintiff) were interviewed. She also discusses transporting them, which ones were the ones charged, and that they were all suspended from school for five days pending a hearing. She then stated that she obtained a case number for the incident (2016-0000194) and returned to her normal duties. See Court Docket No. 68-6. The Jasper County Sheriff Office Summary submitted by the Plaintiffs states that Loadholt watched the video, but that Loadholt and Smith did not know the students so they relied on the staff to give them their names. See Court Docket No. 68-11, p. 3. None of J.A.'s testimony or Plaintiffs' exhibits establish that Loadholt was the one who made the decision to charge J.A. following this incident.
In sum, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence to show that either Loadholt or Hanley were responsible for J.A.'s arrest or the filing of charges against him. Therefore, they are entitled to dismissal as party Defendants under Plaintiffs' unlawful seizure/arrest claim. Horton v. Marovich, 925 F.Supp. 540, 543 (N.D.Ill. 1996) ["Thus, a Plaintiff suing a government official in his individual capacity and therefore seeking to hold the official personally liable must show that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal rights"].
As for Deputy Smith (the investigating and charging officer), the issue before the Court is whether the evidence presents a genuine issue of fact as to whether he had probable cause to charge J.A. with a crime. See Wortman v. Spartanburg, 425 S.E. 2d 18, 20 (S.C. 1992) ["The fundamental question in determining whether an arrest is lawful is whether there was 'probable cause' to make the arrest"]. In considering this question, it is important to note that although J.A. testified at his deposition that he was not involved in the fight and was only trying to keep a girl he knew from becoming involved; see J.A.'s Deposition, pp. 183, 198-199; the fact that J.A. asserts his innocence, or even that the charges against him were ultimately dismissed, does not mean that Smith did not have probable cause to file charges against him. Rather, Plaintiff's false arrest/seizure claim succeeds or fails on whether Smith had probable cause to make the arrest, not on whether later evidence may call the charges into question, or the charges are ultimately dismissed. Brown, 278 F.3d at 368 [In assessing the existence of probable cause, courts examine the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest]; Beck, 379 U.S. at 91 [Probable cause exists for a seizure if the totality of the facts and circumstances are "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [individual] had committed or was committing an offense"]; Jackson v. City of Pittsburgh, 492 Fed.Appx. 297, 299 (3d Cir. 2012) [Noting that the ultimate dismissal of charges is not relevant to whether the defendant officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff at the time of his arrest]; Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3rd Cir. 2005) ["[I]t is irrelevant to the probable cause analysis . . . whether a person is later acquitted of the crime for which he or she is arrested"]; Dowling v. Arpaio, 858 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1082 (D.Ariz. 2012) ["Probable cause to make an arrest may exist despite the fact that the charges are subsequently dismissed or the accused is found to be innocent."] (quoting Hockett v. City of Tucson, 678 P.2d 502, 505 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)).
Plaintiff testified that he did not have any conversations with Smith. See J.A.'s Deposition, p. 120.
Considered in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the evidence shows that J.A. was at the scene of the student riot, and even went up into the bleachers where the fighting was taking place. Although J.A. testified that he was not involved in the fighting, he also testified that there were a great number of students ("Like 50") involved, and while he testified that he was not in the area where the fight was taking place, he also further testified as follows:
Pittman v. Nelms, 87 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1996) [In considering the merits of a motion for summary judgment, the facts and evidence are considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion].
Question: Is there anyway that anyone could have mistaken you for being in that area where the fight was?See J.A.'s Deposition, pp. 102, 181. Further, while J.A. also testified that there was a school video that (he contends) showed he was not in the area where the fight was, he also agreed with a characterization of that video as being inconclusive because it was taken from a distance and showed a "swarm" of people. Id., pp. 102, 182. Even so, Plaintiffs argue that other people involved in the altercation (either as "subjects" or victims) gave statements to the effect that J.A. was not involved in the fight, and have submitted two affidavits, which state in the relevant part:
Answer: Probably could have. Somebody probably could have.
Question: Okay. Would it have reasonable for someone to think you were in the area where the fight was.
Answer: Probably.
7) Deputy Smith gave me a piece of paper and told me to write down what happened and who was involved.
8) While in my statement I did not specifically state Jeremiah Adkins was not involved, I did not in any way say he was involved in the fight.
9) Later after writing my statement several of us learned that Dr. Dinkins was
accusing Jeremiah of being involved in the fight and hitting people.See Mervin Affidavit, ¶¶ 9-12 [Court Docket Nos. 67-3, 68-3]; Orr Affidavit, ¶¶ 9-12 [Court Docket Nos. 67-4, 68-4].
10) This was not true and I as well as several other people tried to explain to Deputy Smith that Jeremiah had nothing to do with the fight.
11) We all made it quite clear to Deputy Smith that Jeremiah did nothing wrong and was not involved in the fight, however, Deputy Smith did not seem to care what we were all telling him.
12) I, as well as everyone else there, knew Jeremiah Adkins did nothing wrong, he was not involved in the altercation and he certainly did not hit or punch anyone.
There were apparently three videos. See Court Docket No. 67, p. 4, n. 4. The video submitted is the one that was taken by the school camera and viewed prior to the arrests. See Court Docket No. 60-6. There was another video submitted at J.A.'s hearing that is not in the record. However, there is a video of the hearing itself where individuals discuss what they are allegedly seeing and not seeing on that video. See Court Docket No. 60-6. According to the parties, at the conclusion of J.A.'s criminal case, all the records of the case were ordered to be expunged. Therefore, some of the items of evidence cited to by the parties apparently no longer exist. See Smith Affidavit, ¶¶ 9-10.
For his part, the Defendant Michael Smith attests that he was the lead investigating officer following the altercation, and that based on his investigation and eyewitness identification by a reliable administrator witness, he made the probable cause determination and decision as to the juveniles to be detained and the young adults to be arrested. See Smith Affidavit, ¶ ¶ 5 and 10. Smith attests that his "probable cause determination relied directly upon eyewitness testimony of Assistant Principal Dinkins who was present at the scene of the riot/altercation, who was in the center of the area of the fight, who was very familiar with the student involved from his lengthy position of authority over the students, and who very clearly and verbally and physically identified the students who were detained and those adults who were arrested". Id., ¶ 10. Smith attests that Assistant Principal Dinkins provided a direct statement to him in front of J.A. and also later his father (both identifying J.A. by his whole name and by Dinkins pointing him out) that J.A. "ran into the area of the fight 'swinging like a Wild man' and engaged in combative behavior . . . ." Id., ¶ 11. Smith attests that before reaching his conclusions he did also review the video surveillance from the school camera with the school personnel and others present, that Dr. Dinkins pointed out the areas where he observed various students and the actions he observed to have been taken by those students, that Dr. Dinkins identified the students by name and by physically pointing them out at the school that day, and that although it was hard to see each person in the video, the video was a useful tool when used by the eyewitness Administrator Dinkins and others present to demonstrate who was in what area and what they observed during the fray. Smith attests that Dr. Dinkins was able to provide a statement of what he saw in the center of the riot from his first hand observation, and that he "unequivocally provided eyewitness identification of J.A. being involved in the altercation actively and swinging like a Wild man". Id., ¶ 12. Smith further attests that while cell phone footage was provided by a student at the later school disciplinary hearing (it is unclear exactly what this video showed, as it also has not been submitted as evidence), at no time during the making of his probable cause determination was that video offered to him for consideration, nor was he ever provided with a copy of this video for consideration during the time the prosecution of the juvenile charge was pending. Id., ¶ 13. Finally, Smith attests that he attended interviews of school personnel with students and that in those interviews and statements of involved persons, almost all of the students interviewed (including J.A.) stated that they had entered the area of the fight only in order to break up the fight, and almost all, including J.A., also denied that they, or their friends, had participated in the fight. Id., ¶ 14.
Smith also confirms that neither Hanley or Loadholt exercised any input into the charges brought, arrests or detainments made, or recommendations to the DJJ officer regarding release to parents or transport to DJJ. Id., ¶ 7.
However, as previously noted, a video of the hearing itself, where the video was shown, is in the evidence and includes statements made by J.A.'s parents and the hearing officer about what they were observing. See Court Docket No. 60-6. Plaintiffs also submitted a copy of the hearing officer's letter to J.A.'s parents wherein he states that "Dr. Dinkins stated that he saw Jeremiah throwing punches. Video evidence shows Jeremiah climbing the bleachers but not in the area where the fight was taking place." See Court Docket Nos. 67-10; 68-10.
Although these statements have not been submitted into evidence, Smith's statement supports Plaintiffs' claim that many of the subjects or victims in the brawl said he was not involved, as apparently (according to Smith) this was a common statement as related to most of the people involved. See also Plaintiffs' Exhibits [Mervin and Orr Affidavits].
This evidence, even considered in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, does not give rise to a genuine issue of fact that Smith did not have probable cause to charge J.A. in this case. "Probable cause exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer 'had reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense'". United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d at 588. Here, the evidence Smith had before him at the time was that J.A. was on the scene of the riot, was in the bleachers where the riot occurred, and he had an eyewitness statement from the Assistant School Principal, who was also on the scene during the riot, that J.A. was a participant in the riot. See McKinney v. Richland County Sheriff's Department, 431 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 2005) [Finding probable cause existed where the arrest warrant was based primarily on the victim's statement against the accused], citing Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1991) [Noting that "it is difficult to imagine how a police officer could obtain better evidence of probable cause than an identification by name of assailants provided by a victim, unless, per chance, the officer were to witness the crime himself"]; Pearson v. City of Woodruff, No. 17-1869, 2018 WL 7825494 at * * 6-7 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2018) ["[A] victim's statement may constitute sufficient probable cause unless there is an apparent reason for the officer to believe the victim is lying."] Report and Recommendation adopted by, 2019 WL 637625 at * 2 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2019) ["While it is possible that the evidence at the scene may have also supported Plaintiff's version of events, this does not change the fact that a victim's statement may constitute sufficient probable cause unless there is an apparent reason for the officer to believe that the victim is lying"]. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to show that Smith had any cause or reason to think that Dinkins was or would have been lying to him for any reason. See United States v. Beckham, 325 F.Supp.2d 678, 687 (E.D.Va. 2004) [A victim's statement will normally constitute sufficient probable cause unless there is an apparent reason for the officer to believe the victim is lying], citing Ahlers v. Schebil, No. 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999).
Further, the evidence shows that before making the decision to file charges, Smith participated in the interviews with other individuals present and viewed whatever video tape evidence was available. Therefore, while Plaintiffs complain that Smith's investigation and factfinding were inadequate, there is no evidence that Smith did not review all of the evidence that was available to him at the time, including the eyewitness statement from the school's Assistant Principal that he had personally observed J.A. engaging in the riot and "swinging his arms like a Wild man", in making his probable cause determination. As noted, J.A.'s mere denial that he committed an offense does not negate a finding of probable cause by the charging officer where a witness has told the officer they saw the accused commit the alleged offense. To find otherwise would mean that all an accused has to do to defeat a finding of probable cause is to deny that they had committed the offense. Pearson v. City of Woodruff, No. 17-1869, 2019 WL 637625 at * 3 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2019)["reasonable officers need not 'resolve every doubt about a suspect's guilt before probable cause is established.'"] (quoting Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 264); see also Sowards, 690 F.3d at 588 [Probable cause exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer 'had reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense'"]. Therefore, Smith is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' unlawful arrest/seizure claim.
With respect to the remaining two Defendants, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the Defendant Jeannie Jefferson (now Jeannie Jefferson Lett) was involved in J.A.'s arrest. At the time of the school riot, she was an assistant principal at Ridgeland/Hardee High School. Jefferson attests that on January 28, 2016 she heard a call for assistance on her radio from Leroy Dinkins, another assistant principal at the school, about a fight in the gym among a group of students. However, Jefferson attests that by the time she arrived in the gym, the fight was over. She attests that she did not witness any of the fighting, nor did she see what (if any) involvement J.A. may have had in the fight. Jefferson further attests that after the fight was over she was present in one of the rooms where students who had been involved in the fight were being interviewed by administrators and law enforcement personnel, but she did not speak with J.A. Jefferson attests that she did not provide any information to law enforcement personnel about which students were involved in the fight, or specifically whether J.A. was involved, as she did not witness any part of the fight. See generally, Jefferson Affidavit. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence to dispute any of the sworn statements made by Jefferson in her affidavit. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not even discuss Jefferson, or her arguments for why she should be granted summary judgment, in their memoranda filed in opposition to the Defendants' motion. Therefore, Jefferson is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Horton, 925 F.Supp. at 540 ["Thus, a Plaintiff suing a government official in his individual capacity and therefore seeking to hold the official personally liable must show that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal rights"].
Finally, with respect to the Defendant Dinkins, the role he played in the events at issue is essentially not in dispute. Dinkins has submitted an affidavit wherein he attests that he has known J.A. since he was in middle school, and that they have always had a good relationship, which J.A. does not dispute. See Dinkins Affidavit, ¶ 2; see also J.A.'s Deposition, p. 22. Nor is there any evidence that Dinkins had any prior reason or disposition to try to get J.A. into trouble, or to assert false claims or allegations against him. Plaintiffs don't even contend that there is any such evidence. Dinkins further attests that in his affidavit that when he and "Coach Faber" were in the gym speaking with the students, "a major student fight broke out in the stands among the feuding female groups". See Dinkins Affidavit, ¶ 8. Dinkins attests that he, Coach Faber, and another staff member went up into the stands to try to stop the fighting while also calling on the radio for assistance. Dinkins specifically attests that he "immediately identified several of the students whom I saw involved in the fighting. Those I identified included J.A., and a particular female student, a friend of J.A., whom he has said he was trying to stop from getting involved in the fighting. There is no questions in my mind that I saw J.A., as well as his friend, involved in the fighting. J.A. definitely was swinging his arms in a very aggressive manner". Dinkins further attests that during the melee, he was knocked over and caught his foot in part of the railing, and suffered a severely strained ankle which required medical attention. Id., ¶ ¶ 10, 11. Dinkins attests that during the subsequent investigation and providing of information to the responding deputy sheriffs, they watched a video camera recording that had caught the fight from a wide, side angle and at a distance, and that in the video he [Dinkins] could see J.A. running up into the stands (which J.A. does not deny), although the video is not clear enough to identify the students who where actually fighting. Rather, Dinkins told all of the parents whose children were involved in the brawl that he had personally seen their children fighting, and that because he was there in the stands, and knew who J.A. was and saw him swinging his arms, he had "no doubt about what I saw. J.A. was the only boy involved in the brawl". Id., ¶ ¶ 15-16. Even so, Dinkins attests that, beyond identifying the students involved in the fight, he played no role in the decision about which students were to be detained or arrested, and that the deputy sheriffs were the ones who decided which students were to be detained or arrested based on the evidence provided. Id., ¶ 14. Confirming this statement, Deputy Smith also attests that the decisions on who to arrest or detain "were his determinations", and was a decision made by him after his investigation and reviewing and considering all the available evidence, including Dinkins' eyewitness statement. See Smith Affidavit, ¶ ¶ 5, 11-12, 14-15.
Again, there is no evidence that Dinkins made a deliberate false statement in identifying J.A. as being involved in the student riot, with his eye witness statement being credited towards the finding of probable case in the case. United States v. Beckham, 325 F.Supp.2d at 687 [A victim's statement will normally constitute sufficient probable cause unless there is an apparent reason for the officer to believe the victim is lying]; see also McKinney, 431 F.3d at 418 [Finding probable cause existed where the arrest warrant was based primarily on the victim's statement against the accused]; Pearson, 2018 WL 7825494 at * * 6-7 ["[A] victim's statement may constitute sufficient probable cause unless there is an apparent reason for the officer to believe the victim is lying."] Report and Recommendation adopted by, 2019 WL 637625 at * 2. There is also no question of fact that Dinkins is not the one who arrested or seized J.A.. Rather, that was an independent judgement exercised by Smith based on his finding of probable cause. As correctly noted by the Defendants, while liability under § 1983 for an unlawful arrest can include government officials other than the officers who arrest, liability must result from intentional acts. Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (3rd Cir. 2000); see also Friedman v. New York City Administration for Children's Services, No. 04-3077, 2005 WL 2436219, at * 8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005) ["[A] defendant who causes an unlawful arrest or prosecution may be held responsible civilly [only] if he does so by maliciously providing false information"]. As such, even if Dinkins identified J.A. as being a participant in the fight by error, that is not sufficient to sustain a constitutional claim against him for false arrest under § 1983. Hannibal v. Sanchez, No. 13-640, 2014 WL 3845172, at * 5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014) ["[T]here is no liability for merely giving information to legal authorities, who are left entirely free to use their own judgment"]. Therefore, Dinkins is also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' false arrest/seizure claim.
Excessive Force Claim. Plaintiffs also assert in their Fifth Cause of Action that J.A. was subjected to "excessive and unreasonable force". Fourteenth Amendment claims of excessive use of force during an arrest or seizure are considered under an "objective reasonableness" standard. Waters v. Stewart, No. 15-4143, 2019 WL 1146685, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2019)["[T]he appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim is solely an objective one," and "a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable," regardless of the officer's state of mind.]; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015); see also Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2016).], aff'd, 776 F. App'x 134 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-7319, 2020 WL 1325974 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2020)].
Plaintiff's claim apparently derives from what may have occurred after J.A. had been arrested. The Fourth Amendment would apply to any excessive force used during J.A.'s arrest. See French v. Richland County, No. 11-717, 2014 WL 1320239, at 5, 7. Even if considered under the Fourth Amendment, however, Plaintiff's claim still fails for the reasons set forth herein. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has held that for a pretrial detainee to establish an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, he need not show that the officer was subjectively aware that the use of force was excessive; rather, he need
only show that the force purposely, knowingly, or possibly recklessly used against him was objectively unreasonable. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. at 2472.Allen v. Lutz, No. 18-2542, 2018 WL 6068484, at *2 n. 1 (D.S.C. Oct. 24, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-2542, 2018 WL 6065260 (D.S.C. Nov. 20, 2018), vacated, No. 18-2542, 2019 WL 117314 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2019), and report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-2542, 2019 WL 117314 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2019). The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim for the simple fact that there is no evidence that any force was used against J.A. by any of these Defendants at all. The undersigned is again constrained to agree.
The evidence (even considered in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs) shows that following the riot the students were placed in classrooms at the school where they were interviewed by school administrators (during which the sheriff's deputies were present) and witness statements were obtained, following which (after which it had been determined who was to be charged) J.A. was transported to DJJ by Officer Hanley. There is no evidence that there was ever any physical force used against J.A. at all by any of the named Defendants. Therefore, the evidence fails to set forth a genuine issue of fact that any Defendant named in this cause of action used constitutionally "excessive" force against J.A. under the circumstances. Waters, 2019 WL 1146685, at *6; cf. Wilson v. Flynn, 429 F.3d at 468 [reasonableness of amount of force used must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene]; Young v. Prince George's County, Md., 355 F.3d at 757 [Court should "view the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene"]; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) ["[N]ot every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action"]. This claim is without merit and should be dismissed.
Due Process Claim. Plaintiffs also allege an unspecified "due process" violation in their Fifth Cause of Action, citing to the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Fourteenth Amendment simply makes the Fourth Amendment applicable to state and local governmental entities. Zelarno v. Taylor, No. 09-2860, 2011 WL 3794143 at * 3 (D.S.C. Aug. 24, 2011) ["The Fourteenth Amendment essentially extends the federal right of due process, as provided in the Fourth Amendment, to state and local levels of government"]. Plaintiffs' Fourth Amenent claims have already been addressed, supra. Moreover, Plaintiffs did not address "due process" as a separate claim or argument in their response to the Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Jones v. Danek Medical, Inc., No. 96-3323, 1999 WL 1133272, at * 3 (D.S.C. Oct. 12, 1999)["The failure of a party to address an issue raised in summary judgment may be considered a waiver or abandonment of the relevant cause of action."].
Therefore, to the extent a Fourteenth Amendment "due process" claim has intended to be separately asserted by the Plaintiffs, it should be dismissed.
State Law Claims
In addition to their one federal cause of action, discussed hereinabove, supra, Plaintiffs asserts four remaining state law causes of action in their Complaint. However, if the Court adopts the recommendation contained herein with respect to Plaintiffs' sole federal cause of action, the only claims remaining in this case will be these state law claims, and under such circumstances, this Court should not retain jurisdiction over these state law causes of action but should instead remand them back to state court for disposition. See Clark v. Brown, 861 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1988)[Directing dismissal of state law claims on remand following dismissal of Plaintiff's federal § 1983 claim]; Mills v. Leath, 709 F.Supp. 671, 675-676 (D.S.C. 1988) [Noting that federal courts should generally decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissal of federal claims in a lawsuit].
Plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss their other originally asserted state law claim, for outrage (Third Cause of Action).
In Carnegie-Mellon v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), the Supreme Court held that "in the usual case in which all federal - law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendant jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims". Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350, n. 7. The "factors" the Court was referring to in Carnegie-Mellon are judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Here, comity obviously favors a remand, as a remand of these remaining state law causes of action will allow the more appropriate court to rule on these exclusively state law issues. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 726 (1966) ["Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well"]. There are also no issues of judicial economy, convenience or fairness weighing against remand, as discovery has been completed and the summary judgment motion relating to these state law claims has been briefed and is ready for decision by the state court on remand. Additionally, not only is the state court the more appropriate court to now rule on these remaining state law claims, but if summary judgment were to be denied on any of these claims (a decision which should be made by the state court), it would be much more appropriate for the state courts to then try these state law claims. Finally, in considering whether remand is appropriate, District Courts in the Fourth Circuit have also taken into consideration whether the complaint was originally filed in federal court. Spears v. Water & Sewage Auth. of Cabarrus Cty., No. 15-859, 2017 WL 2275011, at * 9 (M.D.N.C. May 24, 2017). Of course, here the case was not originally filed in federal court - rather, it was removed to this Court by the Defendants from the Plaintiffs' preferred state court jurisdiction. Hence, the Carnegie-Mellon factors support remand in this case.
The Fourth Circuit has made clear that in circumstances as are present in this case, it should be left to the state courts to resolve these uniquely state law issues. Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2017) [Noting the unique nature of state tort laws, and holding that "we think the definition of legal duties under the law of tort is best left with the state courts to resolve"]. As was noted by the Fourth Circuit in Safar, "the better course in this particular instance is to allow Plaintiff [ ] the opportunity to press [his] state court claims in state court". Safar, 859 F.3d at 251 [Reversing the District Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims, and remanding with instructions to dismiss Plaintiff state law claims without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to advance [his] case in state court]. Therefore, if the Court adopts the recommendation herein for dismissal of Plaintiffs' sole federal claim, their four (4) remaining state law causes of action should be remanded back to state court for disposition. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 ["Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well"]; Mills, 709 F.Supp. at 675-676 [Noting that federal courts should generally decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissal of federal claims in a lawsuit]; Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350, n. 7 ["[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims."].
The Safar case was originally filed in Federal Court, not state court, therefore the order for the District Court would be a dismissal without prejudice rather than remand in that case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action asserting a federal claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that that claim be dismissed. With respect to Plaintiffs' four remaining state law claims, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to those causes of action should be denied, without prejudice, with those claims being remanded back to state court for disposition. Cf. Clark, 861 F.2d at 68 [Directing dismissal of state law claims on remand following dismissal of Plaintiff's federal § 1983 claim].
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
/s/_________
Bristow Marchant
United States Magistrate Judge April 30, 2020
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).