Opinion
No. 124, 2010.
December 20, 2010.
Court Below — Family Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, Case No. 0901008717.
ORDER
This 20th day of December 2010, it appears to the Court that:
1) The defendant-appellant, Evan Adams ("Adams"), a juvenile, entered a plea to Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree, a felony, pursuant to title 11, section 768 of the Delaware Code. The Family Court sentenced Adams to a Level IV placement at Stetson School, a residential sex offender treatment program, for a period of eighteen months. The Family Court denied Adams' Petition for Relief From Registration as a Sex Offender and designated him as a Tier II sex offender. Adams filed a motion for clarification. The Family Court issued a decision that held it does not have any discretion to relieve a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of a felony-level sex offense from registration.
2) Adams has raised five issues in this appeal: first, he is eligible to seek relief from registration as a sex offender based on the legislative changes in the wording of subsection (6) of title 11, section 4121(d) of the Delaware Code; second, the classification, notification, and registration provisions of title 11, sections 4120 and 4121 as applied to juvenile adjudications violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I section 11 of the Delaware Constitution; third, the classification, notification, and registration provisions of title 11, sections 4120 and 4121 as applied to juvenile sex offender adjudications violate the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, section 7 of the Delaware Constitution; fourth, the classification, notification, and registration provisions of title 11, sections 4120 and 4121 as applied to juvenile sex offender adjudications violate the separation of powers; and fifth, the provisions under title 11, section 4121(d)(6) which set out persons who can seek relief from sex offender registration violate Due Process under the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Delaware Constitution since it is impermissibly vague.
3) Subsection 4121(d)(6) of title 11, currently provides:
Notwithstanding any provision in this section or in § 4120 of this title to the contrary, any person who would otherwise be designated as a sex offender pursuant to this section and to § 4120 of this title may petition the sentencing Court for relief from such designation, and from all obligations imposed by this section and § 4120 of this title if:
a. The Tier II or Tier III offense for which the person was convicted was a misdemeanor and the victim was not a child under 13 years of age; and
b. The person has not previously been convicted of a violent felony, or any other offense set forth in paragraph (a)(4) of this section, or of any offense specified in the laws of another state, the United States, or any territory of the United States, or any offense in a foreign jurisdiction which is the same as, or equivalent to, such offenses; and
c. The sentencing court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that such person is not likely to pose a threat to public safety if released from the obligations imposed by this section, and by § 4120 of this title.
Notwithstanding anything in this paragraph to the contrary, no person designated as a Tier II or Tier III sex offender shall be afforded relief from designation as a sex offender if the victim of any of the offenses for which the person was convicted were less than 12 years old at the time of the crime, unless the person was also less than 18 years old at the time of the crime in which case the prohibition set forth in this sentence shall not apply . . .
4) The only issue that Adams raised in the Family Court is whether he qualifies for relief from sex offender registration under the exception in section 4121(d)(6). In the Family Court, Adams did not raise any of the arguments he now presents that section 4121(d)(6) is in violation of the state and federal constitutions. This Court reviews issues not presented to the Family Court for plain error. Plain error is error "so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process." We decline to review Adams' unpreserved constitutional claims of error because the vagueness issue is without merit and Adams' other contentions are controlled by the prior decisions of this Court in Helman, Clark, and Coleman.
Supr. Ct. Rule 8; Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 990 (Del. 2004).
Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058 (Del. 2001).
Clark v. State, 2008 WL 3906890 (Del. Sept. 4, 2008).
Coleman v. State, 729 A.2d 847 (Del. 1999).
5) Having considered this matter after oral argument and on the briefs filed by the parties, the Court has determined that the final judgment of the Family Court should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Family Court in its decision dated February 4, 2010.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.