Opinion
No. 1:94-CV-542
July 1, 2002
OPINION
On November 21, 2001, defendant City of Holland filed its motion for award of costs and attorney fees (dkt. #32). Plaintiff Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc., filed a response (dkt. #33), to which defendant filed a reply (dkt. #36). The Court heard oral argument from the parties on January 22, 2002. For the reasons set forth below, the Court now denies defendant's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case began in 1994 when plaintiff Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc., filed suit against the City of Holland, alleging violations of the Michigan Home Rule City Act ("HRCA"), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 117.1 et seq., and the relevant provision of the Zoning Enabling Act ("ZEA"), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.581 et seq. Adams Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Holland, 883 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Mich. 1995) [hereinafter "Adams I"]. Plaintiff also claimed a violation of his first amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. After this Court abstained from exercising its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law issues in Adams I, plaintiff brought suit on its state law claims against defendant in Allegan County Circuit Court [hereinafter "Allegan County litigation"]. See Adams Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Holland, No. 5:97-cv-244, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6751, *3 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 1998) [hereinafter "Adams II"]. The Allegan County Circuit Court found that the City's zoning ordinance was overbroad and invalid under the HRCA and the ZEA. Id. at *3. Plaintiff then returned to this Court seeking a preliminary injunction against the City's adoption of a 120-day moratorium on the construction or completion of new billboards ("Adams II"). See id. at ** 1, 6. This Court denied plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the 120-day moratorium did not violate plaintiffs first amendment rights. Id. at *27.
Defendant also filed an action for injunctive relief against plaintiff in Ottawa County Circuit Court, as well as criminal misdemeanor charges against plaintiff in 58th District Court. Id. at *4; Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Reinstate and for Award of Costs and Attorney Fees ("Defendant's Brief") 3-4; Brief of Adams Outdoor Advertising in Response to City of Holland's Motion to Reinstate and for Award of Costs and Attorney Fees ("Plaintiffs Response Brief") 3. Defendant did so in response to what it claimed was a "billboard blitz" by plaintiff after the Allegan County Circuit Court's decision. Defendant's Brief at 3.
Ultimately, defendant prevailed on plaintiffs state law claims in state court. In May of 2001, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the challenged sections of Holland's city ordinance were "valid on their face under the HRCA and [the Michigan City and Village Zoning Act]." Adams Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Holland, 463 Mich. 675, 686 (2001). In addition, plaintiff pled no contest to 40 counts of misdemeanor ordinance violations. Plaintiffs Response Brief at 3. Finally, the Ottawa County Circuit Court litigation was ultimately dismissed as moot. See id. at 4, Exh. C; Defendant City of Holland's Reply to Plaintiffs Response to City of Holland's Motion for Attorney Fees 6.
Defendant now seeks attorney fees incurred in these state civil and criminal court proceedings, as well as for the prior proceedings before this Court. At oral argument, defendant informed the Court that it had pending in state court an action for attorney fees incurred in the Ottawa County Circuit Court litigation and the 58th District Court criminal proceedings. The Court denied defendant's request for attorney fees, as it related to those two proceedings, on the basis of comity. The Court also noted that because there was a pending state court action, defendant's request for attorney fees to this Court with regard to the Ottawa County Circuit Court and 58th District Court proceedings was premature.
Now before the Court is defendant's motion for attorney fees and costs incurred in Adams I, Adams II, and the Allegan County litigation. For the reasons stated below, the Court also denies defendant's request for attorney fees incurred in these proceedings.
II. ANALYSIS
Section 1988 provides that in an action or proceeding to enforce the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b) (2002). Defendant asserts that all of the litigation stemming from plaintiffs original complaint filed with this Court has been resolved in defendant's favor. As a result, defendant contends that it is entitled, as the prevailing party, to attorney fees under § 1988.
There are two basic problems with defendant's argument. First, while defendant prevailed on plaintiffs state law claims and on plaintiffs request for preliminary injunctive relief, defendant has not prevailed on the merits of plaintiffs underlying § 1983 claim.
Plaintiffs request for preliminary injunctive relief in Adams II involved Holland's 120-day moratorium, not the sections of the Holland ordinance that plaintiff claimed, in Adams I, violated the first amendment.
In its briefs, defendant cites to two cases, neither from the Sixth Circuit, in which plaintiffs obtained attorney fee awards pursuant to § 1988 for fees incurred in state court proceedings. In Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1986), the First Circuit awarded attorney fees to plaintiffs who had prevailed in state court on their state law claims. In Exeter-West, plaintiffs filed suit in federal court, alleging that a decision by the Rhode Island Commissioner of Education violated both the first and fourteenth amendments. See id. at 49. The district court moved sua sponte to certify the plaintiffs legal question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. See id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled in plaintiffs favor based on its construction of state law, rendering moot plaintiffs constitutional claims. See id. at 49-50. The district court nonetheless awarded attorney fees to plaintiffs under § 1988 for prevailing on the state law issue, and the First Circuit affirmed. See id. at 49-53.
Defendant also cites to Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1982), in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of attorney fees under § 1988 to prevailing prisoner plaintiffs for both federal and state court proceedings. In doing so, the court noted that "the state court proceedings were an essential step in the presentation of the inmates' section 1983 claim because of the Pullman abstention rule." Id. at 914.
Both Exeter-West and Bartholomew, however, involved plaintiffs, not defendants, who were awarded attorney fees under § 1988. Defendant offers the Court no case law in which a court has awarded a defendant attorney fees pursuant to § 1988 for prevailing in state court proceedings.
In addition, the reason for awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs who prevail on non-fee-generating claims, e.g., state law claims, does not apply with equal force to prevailing defendants. For example, in Adams I, this Court abstained from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims, noting that "state court clarification [of the state law issues] might avoid a federal constitutional ruling." Adams I, 883 F. Supp. at 210. Abstention and state court resolution of state law issues in plaintiffs favor saves federal judicial resources and obviates the need for a federal court to resolve a question of constitutional law. When a defendant prevails on a state law claim, however, the need to resolve the federal constitutional issue raised under § 1983 remains.
The second problem defendant faces is that "prevailing defendants must meet a more stringent standard than prevailing plaintiffs to receive attorney fees." Palazzolo v. Benson, No. 95-1067, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 12444, **7-8 (6th Cir. April 3, 1996) (citing Hughes V. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980) (per curiam)). In fact, the Sixth Circuit has observed that "an award of attorney's fees against a losing plaintiff in a civil rights action is an extreme sanction, and must be limited to truly egregious cases of misconduct." Roane v. City of Mansfield, No. 98-4560, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22411, **3-4 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2000) (quoting Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986)). The United States Supreme Court in Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980), adopted as the standard that applies to prevailing defendants in civil rights actions under § 1983, the same standard that applies to prevailing defendants in Title VII actions. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14. In other words, in order for the City of Holland to recover attorney's fees in this case, it must show that Adams's "claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that [Adams] continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Id. at 15 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)). Defendant cannot satisfy this stringent standard.
1. Adams I
In Adams I, this Court abstained from exercising its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims "[i]n light of the apparent lack of clearly established principles in the state statutory and decisional law relevant to the instant case, and the clash of significant interests on both sides of [the] dispute." Adams I, 883 F. Supp. at 210. The Court did not address plaintiffs § 1983 claim, instead dismissing the case without prejudice to plaintiffs right to return to federal court to adjudicate his first amendment claim. See id. It is difficult to conclude under these circumstances that plaintiffs state law claims in Adams I were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.
2. Allegan County Litigation
After this Court's decision in Adams I, Adams filed suit in Allegan County Circuit Court, alleging that the Holland ordinance violated state law. In late 1997, the Allegan County Circuit Court found that portions of the Holland ordinance were overbroad and invalid under Michigan law, and enjoined the City from enforcing those provisions. Adams II, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6751, at **3-4. Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court found that the Holland ordinance did not violate Michigan law. See Adams Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Holland, 463 Mich. 675 (2001). Simply because plaintiff lost on his state law claims, however, does not mean that plaintiffs claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. See Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14 (stating that defendant is not entitled to attorney's fees simply because plaintiff has lost). In fact, "it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable, or without foundation." Riddle v. Egensperger, 266 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). The fact that the trial court found merit in plaintiffs arguments, even though the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately rejected them, suggests that plaintiffs state law claims were not frivolous or without foundation. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Michigan Supreme Court would have granted leave to appeal if plaintiffs claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.
3. Adams II — Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction
After the Allegan County Circuit Court ruled that certain provisions of Holland's billboard ordinance violated state law, the City enacted a 120-day moratorium on the construction or completion of new billboards. Adams II, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6751, at **3-6. Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, challenging the moratorium on various state law grounds and on the basis of the first amendment. See id. at *1. Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the moratorium. See id. at **1-2.
In its opinion denying plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, this Court held that Holland's "moratorium [did] not violate Adams's First Amendment rights" and, thus, could not "be said to inflict an irreparable injury on Adams." Id. at *27. This Court also noted, however, that the "case present[ed] difficult and close questions of First Amendment law." Id. In other words, even though plaintiff lost his motion for preliminary injunctive relief, his request for such relief was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.
III. CONCLUSION
Defendant has not prevailed on the merits of plaintiffs underlying § 1983 claim. In addition, defendant offers the Court no case authority to support its contention that an award of attorney fees is proper when defendant prevails on plaintiffs state law, as opposed to his § 1983, claims. Finally, defendant fails to satisfy the stringent standard that the Supreme Court has applied to prevailing defendants seeking attorney fees under § 1988. For these reasons, the Court denies defendant's motion for award of costs and attorney fees (dkt. #32). The Court will enter an order consistent with this opinion.
ORDER
In accordance with this Court's opinion of even date,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for award of costs and attorney fees (dkt. #32) is DENIED.