Opinion
No. 4-05-00313-CR
Delivered and Filed: May 3, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2004-CR-4111, Honorable Maria Teresa Herr, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Sandee BRYAN MARION, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On March 1, 2005, Appellant Luis Acosta entered a plea of guilty to the offense of Intoxication Manslaughter. After finding Acosta guilty, and pursuant to the open plea, the trial court sentenced Acosta to twenty years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, without an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon. On August 24, 2005, this court held that Acosta had a right of appeal. In Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994), the Court of Criminal Appeals explained "that by virtue of [a defendant's] nonnegotiated plea a defendant may waive nonjurisdictional defects occurring prior to the entry of the plea. This only means the defendant will not ultimately prevail in his appeal of such matters, not that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it." Therefore, we reviewed the record with regard to any potential errors occurring at or after the entry of the non-negotiated plea. Id. at 743-44. Acosta's court-appointed attorney filed a brief containing a professional evaluation of the record in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel concludes that the appeal has no merit. Counsel provided Acosta with a copy of the brief and informed him of his right to review the record and file his own brief. See Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 85-86 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.); Bruns v. State, 924 S.W.2d 176, 177 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, no pet.). Acosta did not file a pro se brief. After reviewing the record and counsel's brief, we agree that Acosta knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea before the trial court and the trial court sentenced Acosta within the available range of punishment. A judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon a guilty plea and to satisfy the requirements of Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Acosta's trial counsel testified that Acosta had a factual and rational understanding of the charges against him. Acosta subsequently entered a plea of guilty to the charge and offered stipulations to the trial court including an admonition that the facts contained in the stipulation of testimony were true and correct. Additionally, neither Acosta nor his attorney objected to the admission of the State's offer of proof. Thus, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the offense charged. See Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 352-54 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) ("If a defendant testifies that he has read the indictment and that it is `true and correct' or that the allegations in the indictment are `true and correct,' this testimony constitutes a judicial admission of the offense charged and is sufficient to support a guilty plea."). Moreover, we agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. Appellate counsel's motion to withdraw is granted. Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d at 86; Bruns, 924 S.W.2d at 177 n. 1.