Opinion
No. 03-08-00788-CV
Filed: June 30, 2010.
Appealed from the from the District Court of Travis County, 353rd Judicial District No. D-1-GN-07-000500, Honorable Margaret A. Cooper, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Before Justices PATTERSON, PEMBERTON and WALDROP; Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice PATTERSON.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Michael Acosta was employed by appellee, the City of Austin, from June 2003 to May 2006. After his employment with the City ended, Acosta filed suit against the City. In his lawsuit, Acosta, who is of Hispanic descent, alleges that various employment-related actions taken by the City adverse to Acosta were committed in retaliation against him for his complaints that his pay was lower than that of non-Hispanic employees with less experience and tenure. The City filed a motion for summary judgment based, in part, on non-retaliatory reasons for the employment-related actions at issue. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and entered a take nothing judgment against Acosta. We hold that Acosta's lawsuit was timely filed, but that summary judgment was proper based on the non-retaliatory reasons articulated by the City for its actions. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Factual and Procedural Background
Acosta was hired by the City on June 30, 2003. He worked at the Sand Hill power plant operated by Austin Energy, first as a plant mechanic, and then as an operations and maintenance specialist. His employment with the City ended in May 2006.
Acosta filed suit against the City on February 16, 2007, asserting claims under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Acosta alleged that the City discriminated against him based on his national origin, see Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.051 (West 2006), and that the City retaliated against him for his verbal complaints of disparate pay based on national origin, see id. § 21.055 (West 2006). On August 14, 2008, the City filed a motion for summary judgment on all of Acosta's claims. In his response, Acosta nonsuited his discrimination claim, leaving only his retaliation claim. Under this remaining claim, Acosta alleges that the City retaliated against him by (1) issuing a written reprimand against him in January 2006; (2) terminating his employment in May 2006 despite his attempt to withdraw his written resignation; and (3) not rehiring him despite his being "better qualified" than the applicants hired. On October 2, 2008, the district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and entered a take nothing judgment against Acosta. Acosta appeals.
Standard of Review
We review summary judgments de novo. Provident Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Under the standard applicable to a traditional motion for summary judgment, the motion should be granted only when the movant establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant, making every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in the non-movant's favor. See Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49. We will affirm the summary judgment if any ground presented to the district court is meritorious. See Pickett v. Texas Mut. Ins. Co., 239 S.W.3d 826, 840 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.).
Timely Filing of Lawsuit
The City asserted in its motion for summary judgment that Acosta's claims should be dismissed for his failure to file suit within 60 days from receiving a right to sue letter. In his first point on appeal, Acosta argues that the district court erred to the extent it based its judgment on Acosta's failure to timely file suit.
Under the TCHRA, a person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice may file a complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission within 180 days of the date the alleged employment practice occurred, see Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.201(a), .202(a) (West 2006), and the person must file any civil action within two years of the date the complaint is filed, see id. § 21.256 (West 2006). Moreover, the civil action must be brought within 60 days after the date the person receives from the Commission a notice of the right to file a civil action. See id. § 21.254 (West 2006).
On August 28, 2006, the Commission sent Acosta notice of his right to file a civil action. Acosta did not file suit until February 16, 2007. However, between those dates Acosta amended his complaint at the Commission to include an allegation of retaliation, and on December 18, 2006, the Commission sent Acosta a second notice of right to file a civil action. See id. § 21.201(f) (amendment to complaint alleging additional facts relates back to date complaint first received by Commission). Section 21.254 does not require that suit be filed within 60 days of the "initial," "first," or "original" notice. It refers only to "a notice of the right to file a civil action." Id. § 21.254. Acosta's original petition was filed within 60 days of the Commission's December 18, 2006 issuance of a notice of right to file a civil action. Therefore, Acosta's claim of retaliation was not time-barred.
Non-Retaliatory Bases for Adverse Employment Actions
The City also asserted in its motion for summary judgment that the "summary judgment evidence establishes that Defendant had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment actions taken." Where, as here, there is no direct evidence but only circumstantial evidence of discrimination or retaliation, the claim is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973); see also Mayberry v. Texas Dep't of Agric., 948 S.W.2d 312, 315 n. 2 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied) ("We may look to federal civil rights law in interpreting cases brought under the [TCHRA].").
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of discrimination. See Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007). An employer commits an unlawful employment practice under the TCHRA if the employer retaliates or discriminates against a person who opposes a discriminatory practice. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.055. If a plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer may rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Turner, 476 F.3d at 345. If the employer meets its burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present substantial evidence that the employer's reason was pretext for discrimination. Id. If the plaintiff can show that the proffered explanation is merely pretextual, that showing, when coupled with the prima facie case, will usually be sufficient to survive summary judgment. See id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-48 (2000)).
In his second point on appeal, Acosta argues that a "nondiscriminatory" basis for the City's actions is not the same as a non-retaliatory basis. Thus, according to Acosta, when he nonsuited his discrimination claim, the City's arguments in its motion for summary judgment regarding a nondiscriminatory basis for its actions became irrelevant. The City's failure to specifically use the phrase "non-retaliatory basis," Acosta argues, was fatal to its request for summary judgment on Acosta's retaliation claim.
In his second point on appeal, Acosta also presents arguments relating to the "after-acquired evidence doctrine," which the City raised in its motion for summary judgment as an additional defense to Acosta's retaliation claim. We do not address this issue because we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted based on the non-retaliatory bases articulated by the City unrelated to the after-acquired evidence. For this reason, we also do not address Acosta's sixth point on appeal, in which Acosta contends the district court erred in striking portions of Acosta's evidence. That evidence operates only as rebuttal to the after-acquired evidence produced by the City, which we have not considered in our analysis. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1).
We disagree. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to retaliation claims in the same manner as to discrimination claims. See id. at 348; Herbert v. City of Forest Hill, 189 S.W.3d 369, 377 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). Acosta's discrimination and retaliation claims focused on the same employment-related actions by the City. Thus, the City's assertion that it had a legitimate reason for its employment decisions applied equally to Acosta's allegations of discrimination and retaliation. In addressing the applicable employment decisions, the City addressed Acosta's retaliation claim by incorporating all of the arguments it had presented with respect to the discrimination claim. In fact, in his response to the City's motion for summary judgment, Acosta characterized the City's arguments against his retaliation claim as raising non-retaliatory bases, which Acosta then sought to show were "false or pretextual." We conclude that the existence of legitimate, non-retaliatory bases for the City's actions was expressly presented to the district court by the City's motion for summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
In his fourth point on appeal, Acosta contends that he produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the non-retaliatory bases alleged by the City for its actions are pretextual. In its motion for summary judgment, the City argued that, even if Acosta established a prima facie case of retaliation, there were non-retaliatory reasons for each of the City's employment actions at issue, and Acosta failed to raise a fact issue that such reasons were pretextual. In articulating a non-retaliatory reason for an adverse employment action, the City's burden is one of production and not persuasion. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1993). Acosta, then, bears the burden of producing evidence that the non-retaliatory justifications supported by the City's evidence are pretextual. See Shackelford v. Deloitte Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 408 (5th Cir. 1999). Bearing in mind the burden of proof, we analyze the City's non-retaliatory justifications for each of the three adverse employment actions alleged.
The dissent misapplies the burden of proof. To be entitled to summary judgment, the employer is not required to establish, as a matter of law, that its proffered reason for its action was, in fact, the actual reason — and, thus, is not a pretext. Rather, the employer is required to establish, as a matter of law, that its proffered reason is both a legitimate reason and non-retaliatory. See Johnson v. City of Houston, 203 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 2006, pet. denied). Acosta does not argue that the City's proffered reasons discussed herein are not legitimate or non-retaliatory. Acosta argues on appeal that the City's proffered reasons for its actions are pretextual, and he bears the burden as to this point. See id.
In his seventh point on appeal, Acosta argues that the district court erred in not striking portions of thirteen paragraphs from various affidavits as well as certain documents, each of which was attached to the City's motion for summary judgment. Our affirmance of the district court's judgment based on the City's articulated non-retaliatory reasons for its actions is made without relying on (1) the disputed portions of the thirteen paragraphs, (2) the three documents specifically identified as improperly admitted, or (3) any documents that were arguably referenced in paragraph 13 of the City's exhibit 7 and were objected to by Acosta in his motion to strike based on lack of authentication. Therefore, we need not address Acosta's arguments in his seventh point on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1).
Reprimand
On January 13, 2006, Acosta received a written reprimand. The reprimand stated that "throughout 2005" Acosta was "involved with horseplay/pranks and bantering comments towards other Austin Energy employee(s)." According to Acosta, such accusations were false and unsupported, and it was his verbal complaints in 2005 regarding white employees receiving higher pay — which, Acosta alleged, he had communicated directly to two of his immediate supervisors who, in turn, communicated them to the Sand Hill plant's operations and maintenance supervisor Jay Youmans — that caused Youmans to fabricate the reprimand in retaliation. Acosta stated by affidavit that he "refused to sign this reprimand as it was clearly false and just Youmans['s] means of harassing me."
As a non-retaliatory basis for the reprimand, the City asserts that the reprimand was solely the product of a human resources investigation that did not include plant management's discretion. Dexter Robinson, the City's human resources manager, averred that Rachel Rodriguez, a human resources advisor, conducted the investigation. Acosta likewise stated that, during the investigation preceding his reprimand, Rodriguez was the employee who interviewed him. Robinson also averred that it is Austin Energy's practice that investigations be conducted by a neutral party in human resources to maintain objectivity. According to Youmans, Rodriguez issued a report and recommendation that four employees should receive reprimands for their actions. Youmans stated that he did not deviate from Rodriguez's recommendations.
There is no evidence that Youmans deviated in any manner from Rodriguez's recommendations in issuing the reprimands to Acosta and the three other employees. There is no evidence that Youmans or another member of the Sand Hill plant's management had any responsibility for Rodriguez's recommendation that Acosta receive a reprimand. Moreover, there is no evidence that Rodriguez or anyone else in the human resources department was aware of any complaints previously made by Acosta. Acosta, therefore, has failed to meet his burden of producing some evidence that Youmans's reason for issuing the reprimand was pretext for retaliation.
Acosta does not allege that the reprimands given to the other three employees were the result of discrimination (two of the employees reprimanded are white) or retaliation.
Having concluded that Acosta failed to present any evidence controverting the City's non-retaliatory basis for the written reprimand, we need not address his third point on appeal, in which Acosta contends that the reprimand was "materially adverse" and, therefore, could support a prima facie case of retaliation.
Termination
Acosta alleges that his May 2006 termination of employment was done in retaliation for his verbal complaints of disparate pay. It is undisputed that Acosta voluntarily resigned. Nonetheless, Acosta argues that the relevant adverse employment action is Youmans's refusing to allow Acosta to withdraw his resignation.
According to Acosta, he resigned because he was "very depressed" about his father's recent death and he was "mistreated by Youmans at work."
The City presented Acosta's failure to withdraw his resignation within 48 hours as a non-retaliatory basis for Youmans's refusal. It is undisputed that the City had a policy that an employee who submits his resignation reserves the right to withdraw the resignation within 48 hours. The parties dispute when the 48-hour period begins to run — the City contends it began to run when Acosta placed the resignation letter in Youmans's inbox, and Acosta contends it began to run when Youmans actually received the letter. However, we need not consider this factual dispute, because Acosta failed to withdraw his resignation within 48 hours after Youmans actually received the letter.
Because we do not consider this factual dispute, we need not address Acosta's fifth point on appeal, in which he challenges the district court's striking of evidence. The evidence at issue is relevant only to Acosta's argument that the 48-hour period begins to run when the City management representative receives the resignation.
The evidence shows that Youmans received the resignation letter some time before 8 a.m. on Monday, May 1, 2006. Acosta was not at work that Monday or Tuesday. Acosta arrived at work on Wednesday, May 3 before Youmans arrived, which again occurred some time before 8 a.m. Acosta alleges that he approached Youmans immediately upon his arrival so as to withdraw his resignation, but that Youmans "cut him off" and informed Acosta that he could not discuss anything until after some morning meetings. Acosta was not able to meet with Youmans until 11 a.m., at which time Acosta informed Youmans that he wanted to withdraw his resignation, but was told that it was too late.
There is no dispute, therefore, that Acosta did not withdraw his resignation within 48 hours. Acosta alleges that before 8 a.m. he told Youmans he "needed to speak to him about" the resignation, but there is no evidence that he actually communicated his desire to withdraw his resignation to Youmans or any other supervisor until the 11 a.m. meeting. Moreover, the relevant City policy does not require a withdrawal of resignation to occur in person, and yet Acosta did not attempt to accomplish his withdrawal by telephone, by email, or by placing a written withdrawal in Youmans's inbox — the same method by which Acosta had communicated his resignation in the first place. Acosta admits that he was aware of the 48-hour policy and of the fact that Youmans would have received the resignation before 8 a.m. on Monday morning. Despite his admitted knowledge, he allowed the 48-hour period to expire, thus terminating his right to withdraw his resignation. Therefore, Acosta failed to meet his burden of producing some evidence that the City's reason for terminating Acosta was pretext for retaliation.
The dissent's discussion regarding the City's possible motivations is not relevant to the analysis. The alleged misconduct by the City is not its refusal to accept an employee's withdrawal of his own resignation, but its refusal to permit the employee to exercise his right to do so under an existing employee policy. Once the 48-hour period expired, Acosta had no right under the policy to withdraw his resignation, and there is no evidence that Acosta communicated his desire to exercise such right within the 48-hour period or that he was in any way prevented from doing so.
Failure to Rehire
Acosta also alleges that the City retaliated against him after his termination of employment by not rehiring him. Acosta refers to three positions for which he applied: power plant operator and power plant board operator at the Decker power plant on May 22, 2006, and an operations and maintenance specialist with Austin Energy on June 19, 2006. Acosta was not interviewed for or offered any of the three positions.
The City's non-retaliatory justification for its failure to rehire Acosta is that all three positions were filled by internal applicants with more seniority than Acosta. In fact, the two operator positions were posted for "departmental employees only." The only position for which Acosta was even eligible, therefore, was the specialist position. The City provided evidence that internal employees are generally given preference for position openings, and that the person hired was an internal candidate. There is no evidence that the three positions were not filled by qualified, current employees of Austin Energy. Acosta alleges that he produced sufficient evidence of the City's justification being pretextual because when he called Tim Moore, the plant manager at Decker, Moore allegedly stated "I've heard about you," and because Moore admitted in his deposition that Youmans gave him negative information about Acosta. However, Acosta admitted that Moore had informed him that Moore was not the hiring manager. Moore stated by affidavit that his superintendents oversaw the employee selection process, only one candidate was recommended for hire to Moore, and Acosta was not that candidate. There is no evidence that those superintendents had any communications with Youmans or had any retaliatory motive. Acosta argues in his briefing that "if Acosta would have been credited with being a current employee," he would have been "competitive if not better qualified" than the applicants selected for the positions. There is, however, no evidence that the City had any reason to treat Acosta as a current employee when he was not one. Acosta has failed to meet his burden of producing some evidence that the City's reason for not rehiring Acosta was pretext for retaliation.
Conclusion
Acosta's lawsuit was timely filed. However, Acosta failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the City's articulated non-retaliatory reasons for Acosta's reprimand, termination, and not being rehired were pretextual. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
On this record and applying the correct standard of review, this employment retaliation case is a matter for the jury. Because Mr. Acosta established a prima facie case of retaliation and issues of material fact concerning the City's proffered reasons for its adverse employment actions are disputed, summary judgment was improper. See M.D. Anderson Hosp. Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 24 (Tex. 2000); Johnson v. City of Houston, 203 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 2006, pet. denied); Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice v. Cooke, 149 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.). I would conclude that the district court erred by weighing the evidence of retaliation, resolving issues of disputed fact, and ruling as a matter of law that Acosta did not suffer retaliation.
Acosta brought his claims of retaliation pursuant to the labor code. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.055 (West 2006). Section 21.055 of the labor code provides that an "employer . . . commits an unlawful employment practice if the employer . . . retaliates or discriminates against a person who, under this chapter . . . opposes a discriminatory practice." Id.
I therefore concur in the majority's opinion to the extent the majority concludes that Acosta timely filed suit against his former employer, the City, and respectfully dissent to the remainder of the opinion affirming the summary judgment in favor of the City on Acosta's claims of retaliation.
In reviewing a summary judgment, we "must consider whether reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all of the evidence presented." Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 756; Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). Departing from a correct application of the standard of review, the majority holds that Acosta "failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the City's articulated non-retaliatory reasons" for the adverse employment actions challenged by Acosta "were pretextual."
The majority departs from the summary judgment standard by concluding that, even if Acosta established a prima facie case of retaliation, the City's burden to show a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment actions is "one of production and not persuasion." The majority confuses an employer's burden to defeat the legal presumption of retaliation that arises when an employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation with an employer's burden when the employer is seeking summary judgment on a claim of retaliation based on articulated, non-retaliatory reasons for the challenged adverse employment actions.
An employee establishes a prima face case of retaliation by showing that he engaged in protected activity, an adverse employment action occurred, and a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. Johnson v. City of Houston, 203 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 2006, pet. denied) (citing Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2004)). In construing Acosta's petition, the majority unduly constricts Acosta's claims of retaliation. The majority states that Acosta alleged that the City's actions were taken in retaliation for "his complaints that his pay was lower than that of non-Hispanic employees with less experience and tenure." In his pleadings, however, Acosta additionally alleged retaliation for his "objections to his written reprimand, [his] resignation letter citing unfair treatment, and/or [his] charge of discrimination filed in June 2006."
Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, there is a legal presumption that the employer's adverse actions were retaliatory. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000). The employer may defeat this legal presumption by meeting its "burden of production" concerning non-retaliatory reasons for the adverse employment action. Id. (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993)). An employer meets its "burden of production" by introducing "evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a [non-retaliatory] reason for the adverse action." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509 (emphasis in original). In contrast, an employer seeking summary judgment based upon an alleged legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for an adverse employment action, must prove its reason as a matter of law to be entitled to summary judgment on an employee's claims of retaliation. See Willrich, 28 S.W.3d at 24 ("Because this is a summary judgment motion, the burden remained on [the employer] under Rule 166a(c) to prove as a matter of law a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [the employee]'s termination."); Johnson, 203 S.W.3d at 12.
Although the City also sought no-evidence summary judgment, the parties agree that the City's claim that it had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment actions against Acosta is an affirmative defense. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 94, 166a(i).
That an employer satisfied its burden of production to defeat the legal presumption of retaliation, then, does not alter the employer's burden as the movant seeking summary judgment on the affirmative defense of a non-retaliatory reason for its action. As our sister court in Johnson explained,
Ordinarily, if the employer meets its burden of showing a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for termination, then the plaintiff must prove that the employer's stated reason for the adverse action was merely a pretext for the real, retaliatory reason. . . . However, because this appeal involves a summary judgment, the burden remained on the [employer] to prove a legitimate nonretaliatory reason as a matter of law. . . . Therefore, [the employee] could defeat the summary judgment by either: (1) establishing that the [employer]'s summary judgment evidence failed to prove, as a matter of law, that the [employer]'s proffered reason was a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for termination; or (2) offering evidence that otherwise raised a fact issue with regard to pretext.
203 S.W.3d at 12 (citations omitted); see also Niu v. Revcor Molded Prods. Co., 206 S.W.3d 723, 728 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). Further, the evidence concerning the employer's reasons for its actions is viewed in the light most favorable to the employee, not "taken as true" as such evidence is in the legal presumption determination. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509; Willrich, 28 S.W.3d at 24; Johnson, 203 S.W.3d at 12.
When an employee has established a prima facie case of retaliation, probative evidence that an employer's articulated reasons for adverse actions are false may create a fact issue precluding summary judgment. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43 (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509); Bowen v. El Paso Elec. Co., 49 S.W.3d 902, 910 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, pet. denied) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148) ("`[A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.'"). Whether summary judgment is appropriate based upon an employer's articulated reasons for adverse employment actions depends on numerous factors, including the "`strength of the [employee]'s prima facie case'" and the "`probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false.'" Little v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, 177 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st] 2005, no pet.) (quoting Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2002)).
The City's summary judgment motion rested on adducing evidence of its affirmative defense that it had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for each of the adverse employment actions that Acosta challenged. The adverse employment actions challenged by Acosta were: (i) the City issued a written reprimand against him in January 2006, (ii) the City terminated his employment by improperly applying its policy that reserved an employee's right to withdraw a resignation within 48 hours, and (iii) the City failed to rehire him. In response to the City's motion for summary judgment, Acosta presented evidence in response to each of the City's articulated reasons for taking the challenged actions. When we view this evidence in the light most favorable to Acosta, the evidence raises genuine issues of material fact whether the City's articulated reasons for each of the challenged adverse employment actions were false and a pretext for its real reason of retaliation. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, 148. I limit my analysis to the termination of Acosta's employment because it exemplifies the plethora of fact questions here.
The City also moved for summary judgment based upon the timeliness of Acosta's suit and on other affirmative defenses that were applicable to Acosta's discrimination claims but not to his claims of retaliation. They included the same actor and same national origin defenses.
The parties presented conflicting affidavits and extensive deposition excerpts from supervisors and employees at the plant concerning each of the adverse employment actions. Acosta's evidence in response to the City's summary judgment also included his positive performance evaluations from the City.
The evidence concerning the termination of Acosta's employment raises genuine issues of material fact as to the contours of the City's resignation policy, whether the City correctly described its policy, and whether it properly applied the policy to Acosta. The City's resignation policy states:
To resign in good standing, an employee shall submit his/her resignation in writing to his/her Department Director at least ten working days before the effective date of resignation. Any employee submitting a resignation has 48 hours within which to reconsider and reserves the right to withdraw the resignation within this time limit. An employee who gives less than ten working days notice may forfeit terminal pay.
The evidence showed that Acosta placed resignation letters in the boxes of the plant manager and plant superintendent at the end of his shift on April 30, 2006, a Sunday. In his affidavit, Acosta averred that his father passed away in April 2006 and that he "was very depressed about his death and combined with the way I was being mistreated by [the superintendent] at work, I felt like I had to get away from there." In the letters, Acosta stated that he was giving notice that he would be "vacating" his position on May 9, 2006, and included among his reasons that he did not feel that management treated him "fairly." He later sought to withdraw the resignation in accordance with the City's 48-hour policy, but the superintendent did not accept his attempted withdrawal.
The policy is silent concerning when the 48-hour time period begins to run, and the parties presented conflicting evidence on this issue. In its motion for summary judgment, the City contended that the 48-hour time period had expired when Acosta attempted to withdraw his resignation on Wednesday morning and, in any event, the City had discretion to immediately accept his resignation. The City presented evidence that the time period began to run on Sunday evening when Acosta placed the letters in the boxes at the end of his shift. Accepting the City's evidence as true, the period expired on Tuesday evening. Acosta presented contrary evidence that the City's policy was that the time period began to run when management actually received his letter of resignation and that the superintendent received and read his letter sometime after 7:30 a.m. on Monday morning. Accepting Acosta's evidence as true, the period for withdrawing his resignation expired at the earliest sometime after 7:30 a.m. on Wednesday morning.
During his deposition, the superintendent testified that he did not think the plant manager was there Monday morning. In his affidavit, Acosta averred:
After I submitted my resignation letter, I had second thoughts and decided to withdraw my resignation. I called Austin HR . . . on Tuesday early afternoon to ask about the policy related to withdrawing resignations.
Based upon the conversation, Acosta averred that he was told he "had until Wednesday morning to withdraw [his] resignation." Acosta also provided the affidavit of Carol Ann Guthrie who was a union representative with twenty years of experience concerning the City's "policies associated with response deadlines related to all manner of issues to include . . . resignations." Guthrie averred:
I am personally and professionally aware that established practice by the City of Austin with regard to when a time limit begins to run for . . . the City . . . to take action is from the time of the receipt of the document; or, in this case, the resignation letter. As a practical example, if an employee submits a resignation letter by US Mail, the 48 hours begins to run not from the date of the letter or date of the postmark, but the date that the letter was received by the City management representative. Similarly, if the employee submits his resignation letter by placing it in the City management representative's box at work, the 48 hours would begin to run from the time the management representative actually received the letter by removing it from the box and reading it.
During his deposition, the superintendent testified concerning Wednesday morning:
Q: So it was a normal workday. You got there at 7:30?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And what happened? Did you see Mr. Acosta?
A: Yeah. I came through the control room like I do every morning and check and see how things are going with the supervisor. I believe Mr. Acosta was working on the control board that day. He had asked me if he could speak to me about something. And I said I — I think I said — I'm not a hundred percent sure, exactly, what I said, but I think I said I had some meetings and that I would catch up with him as soon as my meetings were over.
In his affidavit, Acosta averred:
I approached [the superintendent] Wednesday morning in the Control Room upon [the superintendent's] arrival and told him that I needed to speak to him about my resignation. [The superintendent] cut me off, telling me that he could not meet with me until have [sic] some meetings that morning. I went to [the superintendent] before 10:00 to again ask to speak with him, but he again put me off until 11:00. . . .
I went to [the superintendent's] office at 11:00 and I was joined there by [the superintendent and two other people]. Again, [the superintendent] cut me off when I tried to speak to him to tell him I wanted to withdraw my resignation. [He] instead told me that he was accepting my resignation. I then told him that I was trying to withdraw my resignation, but he would not allow me to withdraw it. [He] did not make any mention that the 48 hour period had expired the night before. [He] did not make any mention of the 48 hour period.
This evidence supports that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Acosta sought to withdraw his resignation by speaking to the superintendent before the 48-hour time period expired.
Although the parties presented conflicting evidence when the forty-eight hour time period began to run and when it expired, the majority weighs the evidence and concludes that Acosta did not timely withdraw his resignation. The majority comes to the conclusion that there is "no dispute that Acosta did not withdraw his resignation within 48 hours" and further concludes that "there is no evidence that Acosta communicated his desire to exercise such relief within the 48-hour period or that he was in any way prevented from doing so." This issue was sharply disputed. The majority discounts Acosta's unsuccessful attempts to withdraw his resignation during the 48-hour time period by concluding that Acosta could have telephoned, e-mailed, or placed a withdrawal notice in the superintendent's box during the relevant time period. This example is only one of several that demonstrates that the manner in which applying the wrong standard of review undermines the court's analysis. When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Acosta, the evidence that Acosta attempted to speak with the superintendent to withdraw his resignation before the 48-hour time period had expired raises genuine issues of material fact concerning the contours of the policy and the City's application of the policy to Acosta. See Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 755-56.
The parties also presented other conflicting evidence concerning the City's application of its policy to Acosta. The City presented evidence that the policy gave the City discretion to accept a resignation immediately when it was in the "best interest" of the City and that is what happened here. The City presented evidence that it "processed" Acosta's resignation on Monday and accepted it immediately. But if the City accepted his resignation immediately, why was Acosta working on Wednesday until the meeting with the superintendent? Further, the superintendent testified during his deposition that the policy allowing the City to accept a resignation immediately applied only after the 48-hour time period had expired. The superintendent testified:
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that "the City's possible motivation is not relevant to the analysis." Probative evidence that an employer's stated reasons for its actions are false may raise a fact question with regard to pretext. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (noting that "proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive"); Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems., 492 S.W.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The pretext inquiry focuses on the authenticity of the employer's proffered reason."); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003) ("A plaintiff may establish pretext . . . by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is false or `unworthy of credence.'") (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. System, 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001)).
A: I could accept his resignation, yes, effective immediately.
Q: Okay. And when you say "effective immediately," did that mean Monday morning?
A: No. That meant after he — he's allowed 48 hours to rescind his resignation.
The superintendent also testified during his deposition that he felt it was in the "best interest of the company" "to let [Acosta] go right away" "based on what [Acosta] wrote in his resignation letter" that he was "mistreated and unhappy" because a "power plant is obviously not a place where — you know, it could be a dangerous place if . . . your mind is not set on what — concentrating on work. And I didn't feel that based on his letter that his mindset would be safe enough to have him around the workplace." In his affidavit, the superintendent's stated reasons for not allowing Acosta to withdraw his resignation included that Acosta's letter of resignation was a "burns his bridges" letter "by accusing management of lies and slander" and that the safety of the plant was "paramount." Yet he also testified that he allowed Acosta to work for several hours on Wednesday morning before meeting with him "[b]ecause I wasn't available at that time to talk with him and I needed to do my other duties first and I was going to fit him in when I had time."
In addition to his inconsistent testimony concerning the City's decision to immediately accept Acosta's resignation, other portions of the superintendent's testimony conflicted with the evidence. For example, the superintendent testified that when Acosta approached him on Wednesday morning that Acosta only asked if "he could speak to me about something." He denied that Acosta said that he wanted to talk about his resignation. This testimony directly conflicted with Acosta's testimony that he told the superintendent that he wanted to speak to him about his resignation. When further asked during his deposition why he did not accept Acosta's withdrawal of his resignation letter, the superintendent answered:
Because I — based on his resignation letter, I just felt that he wasn't somebody that was happy at the plant, didn't trust management for some reason and wasn't somebody that we wanted in the workplace.
He did not specify the expiration of the 48-hour time period or his safety concerns. See Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems., 492 S.W.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2007) ("A court may infer pretext where [an employer] has provided inconsistent or conflicting explanations for its conduct.")
There was also evidence that the superintendent gave Acosta a negative review, including that Acosta was a "troublemaker," which testimony conflicted with the testimony from other supervisors and the positive performance evaluations that Acosta received during his employment with the City.
Given the conflicting testimony, the questions of whether the City's articulated reasons for its challenged actions were false and whether the City's actions were motivated by something other than those reasons turn on findings of credibility, a traditional function of the jury. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict."); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 8 (1981) (recognizing the nature of the "elusive factual question of intentional discrimination"); Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) (credibility determinations, weighing of the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from the facts are jury functions); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989) (when credibility of affiant likely to be dispositive in resolution of case, summary judgment is not appropriate); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141 (citation omitted) (fact finder in discrimination cases faces questions that are "both sensitive and difficult" and "there will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes").
When genuine issues of fact exist, summary judgment is not appropriate. My disagreement with the majority on the facts and the inferences that should or can be drawn from the facts — as adduced in this case — illustrates that a fact finder needs to decide whether the City's adverse employment actions against Acosta were in retaliation for his protected activities. I would conclude that the record contains ample evidence that — on this record — a reasonable fact finder could find that the City's articulated reasons for its actions were pretextual and false and, therefore, that the City failed to conclusively prove that it had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions to be entitled to summary judgment. See Willrich, 28 S.W.3d at 24; Cooke, 149 S.W.3d at 705. I would reverse the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the City and remand for a trial on the merits or other proceedings.