Opinion
No. 1-046 / 00-1096
Filed April 11, 2001
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis Reis, Judge.
Ace Construction appeals a district court ruling on judicial review that affirmed an award of worker's compensation benefits to David McIlravy. AFFIRMED.
Harry W. Dahl, Des Moines, for appellants.
Maureen Roach Tobin of Whitfield Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
Ace Construction appeals the decision of the district court that upheld the industrial commissioner's award of worker's compensation benefits to David McIlravy. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings . On August 7, 1997, McIlravy, a then thirty-seven-year-old ironworker for Ace Construction (Ace), was working on the framework of a steel building under construction in Ames, Iowa. The job that day, which was representative of McIlravy's work for Ace over the preceding four years, included wearing a heavy tool belt and climbing up and down a 24-foot ladder. Towards the end of the workday McIlravy climbed down from the top of the steel framework to the building's newly-poured concrete floor and removed his tool belt. His supervisor directed him to pick up equipment scattered around the floor.
As he began walking across the flat, smooth surface of the floor he heard and felt something in his right knee, which he equated to a shotgun blast. At that time, while he stopped momentarily, he felt no pain and was able to walk normally. After he had completed the work day and returned home, he noticed some degree of swelling. Although he awoke the next morning with severe pain and swelling, he reported to his current job site. He proceeded to work for several hours, but as the pain and swelling increased, he decided to leave the site to seek medical attention.
An MRI performed on the knee revealed a torn meniscus or cartilage. Other than the meniscus tear, McIlravy's knee was healthy and showed no sign of degeneration or other preexisting condition. Dr. Gehrke, McIlravy's orthopedic surgeon, opined that the nature of McIlravy's employment at Ace put him at risk for the type of injury suffered, and that the injury was caused by his job duties.
The worker's compensation carrier denied coverage, and McIlravy filed a petition for arbitration with the industrial commissioner. The deputy industrial commissioner found that McIlravy had established the injury as work related, and awarded healing period benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, and a penalty for unreasonable denial of the claim. The arbitration award was affirmed by the industrial commissioner and again upon judicial review by the district court.
Scope of Review . When a district court renders a decision pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19, the sole question on review is whether the district court correctly applied the law. Jackson County Public Hospital v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 280 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (Iowa 1979). To make that determination, we apply the standards of section 17A.19(10) to the agency action to assess whether this court's conclusions are the same as those of the district court. See id. The agency action must be supported by substantial evidence in the record. Koehler Elec. v. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2000). Substantial evidence is that which would allow a reasonable mind to reach the same conclusion as the decision maker. Id.
Standard of Review Applied by the District Court . While conceding the district court correctly set forth the applicable statutory provisions governing judicial review, the appellants contend that the court nevertheless applied the wrong standard in reviewing the agency decisions. They argue the court held them to a higher benchmark then that authorized by Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(f) when it stated — relying on the pre-amendment case of Sanchez v. Blue Bird Midwest, 554 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) — the agency decision would be overturned only upon a showing "that the evidence was uncontradicted and reasonable minds could not draw different inferences."
The 1998 amendments to Chapter 17A did not appreciably alter the key language governing judicial review, and a party challenging agency action must still show the action is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, when that record is viewed as a whole. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f) (1999). The main legislative change is presented by new subsections defining the concepts of substantial evidence and the entirety of the record before the reviewing court. The appellants maintain Sanchez is no longer controlling in light of section 17A.19(10)(f)(3), which clarifies a court's obligation to view the record as a whole, stating that an agency finding:
The section currently states that an agency action may be overturned if it is "[b]ased upon a determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f) (1999). Prior to amendment, reversal was warranted where agency action "[i]n a contested case [was] unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole . . . ." Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(f) (1997).
[M]ust be judged in light of all the relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that detracts from that finding as well as all of the relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that supports it, including any determinations of veracity by the presiding officer who personally observed the demeanor of the witnesses and the agency's explanation of why the relevant evidence in the record supports its material findings of fact.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(3) (1999). They argue that Sanchez stands in direct opposition to this section, in that it limits which portions of the record a court may consider when assessing substantial evidence.
Contrary to the appellants' assertions, there is no conflict between Sanchez and section 17A.19(10)(f)(3), and any perceived conflict is based on a miscomprehension of the standard set forth by the Sanchez decision. In reviewing Sanchez and its predecessors, it becomes clear that the disputed language is no more than a recognition of the agency's fact-finding role and the resulting deference that limits the scope of judicial review. These basic principals were not altered by the recent revisions to Chapter 17A. See Koehler Elec. v. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2000) (citing two pre-amendment cases when setting forth the standard of review for agency action). The new definition of section 17A.19(10)(f)(3) serves only to clarify and codify the preexisting concept that a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence presented. See Iowa Health Systems Agency, Inc. v. Wade, 327 N.W.2d 732, 733 (Iowa 1982).
By correctly setting forth the current language of section 17A.19(10)(f), the district court has sufficiently demonstrated its understanding of the appropriate standard of review. We therefore find no error in this regard. However, even if the district court had miscomprehended the meaning of Sanchez and employed an incorrect standard, such action would not necessitate reversal in this case. As discussed below, a proper application of section 17A.19 requires affirmance of the agency decision.
Satisfaction of the "Arising out of" Element . McIlravy had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Ace. Iowa Code § 85.3(1) (1999). See also 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1995). The words "arising out of" refer to the "causal relationship between the employment and the injury." Id. The words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances of the injury. McClure v. Union County, 188 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Iowa 1971).
An injury occurs in the course of employment when the employee was where he was directed to be and in the process of performing, about to perform or engaging in acts incidental to his required job duties. See, e.g., Quaker Oats Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Iowa 1996); Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Iowa 1996). As the record substantially supports and Ace agrees that McIlravy's injury occurred in the course of his employment, the only remaining question is whether the record supports the agency finding that the meniscus tear arose of out McIlravy's employment with Ace.
An injury arises out of the employment only if it is a "rational consequence of the hazard connected with the employment." Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d at 128 (quoting Burt v. John Deere Waterloo Tractor Works, 247 Iowa 691, 700, 73 N.W.2d 732, 737 (1955)). In assessing this factor the Iowa Supreme Court has approved the actual risk doctrine. Under that doctrine the "arising out of" element is satisfied if "the nature of the employment exposes the employee to the risk of such an injury." Hanson v. Reichelt, 452 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Iowa 1990).
Although the rule was adopted in a case where injury resulted from exposure to the elements, the rational has been extended to assess other factual scenarios. See Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Iowa 1996).
Injuries generally fall into one of three categories of risk. The first, risks distinctly associated with employment, are always compensable. 1 Arthur Larson Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 4.01, at 4-2 (2000). The second, risks purely personal to the employee, are classified as idiopathic and are noncompensable. Id. § 4.02, at 4-2. The third is neutral risks, where either the nature of the risk is known but the risk is neither personal nor work related, or the nature of the risk is simply unknown. Id. § 4.03, at 4-2 to 4-3. It appears that in Iowa a risk both neutral and unexplained is noncompensable. See Miedema, 551 N.W.2d at 312. Upon review, the record supports a
finding that McIlravy's injury falls within the first category of risk, or those distinctly associated with his employment.
McIlravy presented expert medical testimony to the effect that the heavy lifting and carrying and knee flexion maneuvers he was required to perform as part of his job duties placed him at an increased risk for the type of injury he sustained, that the risk was associated with his injury, that he had no preexisting condition and that, with the exception of the tornmeniscus, the knee was otherwise healthy. This was the only evidence produced on the issue of causation. Nothing in the evidence indicates the injury was idiopathic, and Ace appears to concede this point. Instead, it contends that, since the evidence in the record is insufficient to demonstrate the injury was due to a risk distinctly associated with McIlravy's employment, the injury is unexplained.
This argument is premised on the fact that the precise moment of injury — the popping sound and sensation in McIlravy's knee — occurred when he was merely walking across a flat surface. However, there is no requirement that an injury be immediately predicated by a sudden or traumatic event, and the medical testimony supports a finding that the type of work McIlravy engaged in exposed him to and increased the risk of precisely the type of injury he suffered. See Koehler Elec. v. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2000) (noting that the correct focus is upon "whether the employment increases the risk of injury"). Given the agency's role in weighing expert testimony, see Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Iowa 1998), a reasonable trier of fact could and did find the record demonstrated McIlravy's injury arose out of his job duties with Ace.
The record, when viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence in support of the agency decision, and the district court was correct in upholding that decision upon judicial review. Having considered all arguments advanced on appeal, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.