Opinion
November 13, 1953.
January 4, 1954.
Torts — Alienation of affections — Alienating husband's affections — Near relatives — Privilege — Scope — Brothers and sisters — Restatement, Torts.
1. One who, either without a privilege to do so or in excess of a privilege, purposely alienates one spouse's affections from the other, or for the purpose of disrupting the existing marriage relation, induces one spouse to separate from the other, is liable for the harm thereby caused to any of the injured spouse's legally protected marital interests. [40]
2. Although a near relative, such as a brother or sister, has a limited privilege which justifies giving advice and counsel in personal matters which may result in alienation of affections, there is no privilege to use threats and coercion aimed directly at alienation of affections or inducing a separation. [40]
3. Restatement, Torts, §§ 683, 684, 686 and 690, cited. [40]
4. The actor's conduct need not be the sole cause of the alienation of affections; it is sufficient if such conduct was the controlling cause, although other causes also contributed. [40]
Argued November 13, 1953. Before STERN, C. J., STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.
Appeals, Nos. 209, 210 and 211, Jan. T., 1953, from judgment of Court of Common Pleas No. 4 of Philadelphia County, March T., 1949, No. 5489, in case of Adele Acchione v. Lawrence J. Acchione, John B. Acchione, Jr. and Edith Monte. Judgment affirmed.
Trespass for alienation of affections.
The facts are stated in the opinion by DAVIS, J., of the court below, as follows:
This is an action in trespass for alienation of affections causing the separation of plaintiff's husband from plaintiff. After a jury trial, a verdict was rendered in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $3,000.00. Defendants moved for a new trial and, alternatively, for judgment non obstante veredicto. The motion for a new trial was withdrawn at bar; after argument before and consideration by the court en banc, the motion for judgment was dismissed and judgment entered on the verdict. An appeal having been taken, we now state our reasons for our decision.
In considering whether judgment should be entered non obstante veredicto all the evidence and inferences therefrom favorable to the party obtaining the verdict must be taken as true, and all unfavorable to him, if depending solely on testimony, must be rejected. Chapple v. Sellers, 373 Pa. 544, 545; Geyer v. Thomas, 364 Pa. 242, 243.
Plaintiff and Julius Acchione met in May, 1946. Plaintiff and her family were Baptists, her parents having converted from Roman Catholicism. The Acchione family, including defendants, two brothers and a sister of Julius, were Roman Catholics, but Julius was not an active church member. Plaintiff and Julius agreed to marry, part of which agreement being that Julius would marry plaintiff in a Baptist Church, and sometime later, plaintiff would participate in a Catholic marriage ceremony to please Julius' family. On February 29, 1947, at which time both were twenty-four years of age, they were secretly married in a Baptist Church; neither family was informed of this marriage ceremony. Occasional weekends were secretly lived as man and wife. Eventually plaintiff learned that a Catholic marriage ceremony would entail an oath on her behalf to raise their children in the Catholic faith. It was plaintiff's conviction that this exceeded her undertaking, and, although she was still willing to partake in a Catholic ceremony, she would neither promise to raise her children in the Catholic faith nor would she lie to a priest by falsely promising to do so. Julius had agreed before the first marriage ceremony that their children would be raised in the Baptist faith and then indicated that it was all right with him to be married by a justice of the peace.
About six months after their secret marriage, plaintiff and her husband announced their engagement to both families, and their intention to be married before a justice of the peace, the purpose of which being to partly satisfy or appease the two families and to conceal the Baptist marriage from the Acchione family. Appearing to acquiesce in this decision, both families, including defendants, attended an engagement party, a few months before the second marriage in March of 1948. On the day before their marriage before a justice of the peace, Julius informed plaintiff's family of the secret Baptist ceremony of the year before. After plaintiff and Julius had left for their civil marriage and a week's honeymoon in New York City, plaintiff's mother and sister called on Julius' brother Lawrence, one of the defendants, and informed him, against the wishes of plaintiff and Julius, of the secret Baptist wedding. On the following Friday, after five days of mutually happy honeymooning, Julius learned in a telephone conversation from their hotel room in New York, that his family was upset over the news of the secret Baptist ceremony. Thereupon it was agreed that Julius and plaintiff would return to Philadelphia that evening, to be met at the train by defendant John B. Acchione, Jr., who drove them to Julius' sister Helen's house, where the Acchione family had gathered, with the exception of Lawrence.
At this point, the mounting wrath and indignation of the defendants, stemming from the knowledge of the secret Baptist wedding, was given vent upon plaintiff and Julius. Defendants John Acchione and Edith Monte then threatened plaintiff and Julius that unless they went through a Catholic marriage ceremony Julius, who was a law student, planning to live with his wife in his mother's house, would be cut off by defendant Lawrence Acchione as executor, from his deceased father's estate, receive no financial support from defendants and could not live together under an Acchione roof. Plaintiff and Julius were given the night to come to a decision as to their alternative proposals: live together without Acchione family support, or retention of family support by either separating from plaintiff or by plaintiff's consent to marriage in the Catholic Church including the vows required by that faith. Julius pleaded with plaintiff to consent to their demands in order to retain the support of his family, indicating that if she refused them she must leave because he would not risk the loss of their support.
On the next morning, Lawrence Acchione repeated like threats to plaintiff and Julius and, in view of plaintiff's refusal to submit, ordered plaintiff out of the Acchione household. Defendant John Acchione then drove plaintiff, with her luggage, to her parents' home. Thereafter, Julius did not come back to plaintiff, completed law school with the support of defendants, has continuously remained separated from plaintiff, and secured a divorce in Arkansas, despite an injunction entered by Court of Common Pleas No. 1.
One who, either without a privilege to do so or in excess of that privilege, purposely alienates one spouse's affections from the other, or for the purpose of disrupting the existing marriage relation, induces one spouse to separate from the other is liable for the harm thereby caused to any of the injured spouse's legally protected marital interests. See Restatement, Torts, secs. 683, 684, 686, 690. Near relatives in such a relation which justifies giving advice and counsel in personal matters have a limited privilege in this regard. Restatement, Torts, sec. 686. But, the privilege is not an immunity. Though advice and counsel, including criticism, may be privileged no matter what the consequences, threats and coercion aimed directly at alienation of affections or inducing a separation are not. See Gernerd v. Gernerd, 185 Pa. 233, 237; Beisel v. Gerlach, 221 Pa. 232, 234-235; Ickes v. Ickes, 237 Pa. 582, 596; Joseph v. Naylor, 257 Pa. 561.
" 'It is no defense that (defendants') conduct was not the sole cause of the alienation or separation; it is sufficient if (their) conduct was the controlling cause, although other matters (may have) contributed.' (30 C. J. 1125, sec. 982.)": Summerfield v. Pringle, 65 Idaho 300, 308, 144 P.2d 214, 218.
Defendants contend that the threat to withhold Julius' share of their deceased father's estate could not have coerced Julius because the defendants or the executor had no lawful right or power to deprive Julius of vested rights. Defendants would hardly contend that a threat to physically strike Julius would not constitute coercion merely because they had no lawful right to inflict corporal punishment. The threat to withhold Julius' share, if nothing more than a promise to require Julius to resort to legal remedies to obtain his share of the estate, may constitute coercion when made with the intent to induce Julius to comply with their demands. Added to this, defendants in effect, as may be found from the evidence, promised economic assistance to Julius if he would separate from plaintiff should she maintain her refusal to take the Catholic marriage vows.
We think that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. Motives and malice can only be inferred. There can be no direct evidence of the state of persons' minds. Inasmuch as different inferences could reasonably be drawn from the evidence in this case, it was properly submitted to the jury, and "every right which the (defendants) could properly claim in this regard was carefully stated in a very clear and adequate charge." Gernerd v. Gernerd, 185 Pa. 233, 237. Accordingly, defendants' point for binding instructions was refused and their motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was dismissed.
Defendants appealed.
Thomas P. Mikell, with him Joseph P. Flanagan, Jr., and Saul, Ewing, Remick Saul, for appellants.
Thomas Z. Minehart, with him Charles A. Rothman and Melvin Alan Bank, for appellee.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed on the opinion of Judge JOHN MORGAN DAVIS.