Summary
In Lurie, we found that a GBL 354 order must be served in accordance with the CPLR, and held that, where there was no showing that personal service on an individual was "impracticable" (CPLR 308[5] ; see also CPLR 311[b]), service upon him by mail was improper.
Summary of this case from James v. Ifinex Inc.Opinion
October 3, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Stanley Parness, J.).
The petitioner Attorney-General argues, that actual prior attempts at service pursuant to CPLR 308 (1), (2) or (4) are not an invariable pre-condition to an order permitting expedient service pursuant to CPLR 308 (5) (Liebeskind v. Liebeskind, 86 A.D.2d 207, affd 58 N.Y.2d 858). It remains a requirement that some manner of showing be made that a customary method of service is "impracticable". No such showing was made here. Contrary to petitioner's argument before IAS, a customary method of service was not "ruled out" by respondent Lurie's failure "to reside or abide in or maintain an actual place of business within this state" (CPLR 313; Badenhop v. Badenhop, 84 A.D.2d 771). Nor is there any showing that respondent's fraudulent conduct had created an emergency situation that a normal method was not competent to preempt. Finally, the argument that a normal method of service in Florida would have constituted "a probable exercise in futility" is, in a word, conclusory.
Thus, expedient service of the General Business Law § 354 order was unwarranted unless, as petitioner argues, service of such an order is not governed by the CPLR because the former does not commence an action but merely directs appearances for depositions and the production of documents. Aside from overlooking that General Business Law § 354 presupposes an official determination by the Attorney-General to commence an action under the Martin Act, and, toward that end, provides for "extraordinary enforcement powers" in the form of ex parte injunctive relief (Matter of First Energy Leasing Corp. v. Attorney-General of State of N.Y., 68 N.Y.2d 59, 64), this argument is otherwise unconvincing as it does not comport to methods of service utilized on other applications that are unassociated with an action or proceeding. Indeed, as a general rule, all manner of initial process must be served in accordance with CPLR 308, unless the statute specifically provides otherwise.
General Business Law § 354 must be read in conjunction with General Business Law § 355, which provides: "The order [referring to § 354] shall be served upon the person named * * * by delivering to and leaving with him a certified copy thereof". The words "delivering" and "leaving" connote a clear legislative intent that service of a General Business Law § 354 order be made in accordance with CPLR 308 (1); a liberal construction might also permit service in accordance with CPLR 308 (2); a very liberal construction might even permit service in accordance with CPLR 308 (4); but no reasonable construction would permit service by mailing.
The same conclusion would have to be reached even if General Business Law § 355 did not require that a General Business Law § 354 order be delivered and left with the person named therein. General Business Law § 357 provides that the provisions of the CPLR shall apply to "all actions" brought under the Martin Act except as otherwise provided. A General Business Law § 354 order is closely analogous to both a subpoena and a temporary restraining order, both of which, under the CPLR, must be served in the same manner as a summons (CPLR 2303, 6313 [b]). In the case of a temporary restraining order, the court is expressly empowered to order service otherwise, but it is generally recognized that this power is exercised only when a temporary restraining order is issued in the context of an already pending action (McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C6313:2, at 380).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Kupferman, Ross, Kassal and Smith, JJ.