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holding that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment because the ratio of inmates to cell blocks and the need to "keep inmates involved in gangs or ongoing feuds in separate blocks, makes it impossible to separate all pretrial detainees from convicted inmates"
Summary of this case from Silvera v. Connecticut Department of CorrectionsOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2278 SECTION "K" (3)
May 27, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Timothy Abrams, filed the above-captioned pro se and in forma pauperis complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Sheriff Aubrey Jones, Royce McGhee, and Larry Files. In the complaint, plaintiff claims that defendants failed to protect him from violence, used excessive force against him, denied him medical care, and improperly housed him with convicted inmates during the period of his pretrial detention at the Washington Parish Jail. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Files was incorrectly identified in the complaint as "Dustin Fowles."
Rec. Doc. 1.
Rec. Doc. 12.
On January 8, 2004, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiff opposed that motion. On April 5, 2004, defendants supplemented their motion with an additional affidavit. In light of that fact, plaintiff was allowed until April 29, 2004, to file a supplemental memorandum in opposition, but he has failed to do so.
Rec. Docs. 14 and 19.
Rec. Doc. 21.
Rec. Doc. 24.
Rec. Doc. 25.
The principal purpose of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court may grant judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Procedurally, the party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Taita Chemical Co., Ltd, v. Westlake Styrene Corp., 246 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The party opposing summary judgment must then "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56); see also Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). There is no "genuine issue" when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Summary judgment will be granted against "a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23.
The Court has no duty to search the record for evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). "The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which the evidence supports his or her claim." Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Conclusory statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence and will not suffice to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id.; Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate in any case where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis deleted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As noted, plaintiff claims in this lawsuit that defendants failed to protect him from violence, used excessive force against him, denied him medical care, and improperly housed him with convicted inmates during the period of his pretrial detention at the Washington Parish Jail. The Court will separately address each of those claims.
Failure to Protect
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on detention facility officials the duty to protect a pretrial detainee from violence. This duty has been deemed to be the same as the duty owed to convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment: "[T]he State owes the same duty under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic human needs, including . . . protection from harm, during their confinement." Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In Hare, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held,
Finding no constitutionally significant distinction between the rights of pretrial detainees and convicted inmates to basic human needs, including . . . protection from violence . . ., we conclude that a state jail officer's constitutional liability to pretrial detainees for episodic acts or omissions should be measured by a standard of subjective deliberate indifference as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Farmer [v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)].Id. at 643. The Fifth Circuit has noted that Farmer requires that "[i]n order to act with deliberate indifference, `the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'" Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995) (quotingFarmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
"Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence. . . ." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm may in some instances be inferred from its mere obviousness; however, "obviousness of a risk is not conclusive and a prison official may show that the obvious escaped him." Id. at 842-43 n. 8. Prison officials may be able to avoid liability by showing that they "did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent," or that they "responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Id. at 844.
In the instant case, plaintiff claims that, on July 24, 2003, defendants failed to protect him from violence at the hands of five or six fellow inmates who were angry that the cell block phones had been turned off because of plaintiff s actions. Defendants argue that plaintiff's claim must fail because they had no prior warning of the attack and, therefore, had no actual knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff. In support of their argument, defendants point to the following excerpt from plaintiff's deposition:
In plaintiff's complaint, he indicated that the altercation involved five other inmates; however, he indicates in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment that six other inmates were involved. Rec. Docs. 1 and 21.
Q. Mr. Abrams, had you ever had any problems with McCrae or Bickham [two of the inmates involved in the altercation] before?
A. No, ma'am. I ain't never had no problem with them.
Q. Did you ever approach Deputy Files and tell him that you felt fear that you were going to be attacked by either one of those other inmates?
A. No, ma'am. I never did think this was going to happen. I never had no problem with them. I don't see how they just got so upset behind the phone getting turned off like that.
Q. So you had no warning as to this attack?
A. No.
Rec. Doc. 19, Exhibit E.
Plaintiff has presented no competent summary judgment evidence demonstrating that there was an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety in general of which defendants were aware and to which they were deliberately indifferent. Moreover, based on plaintiff's own sworn deposition testimony, it is clear that neither he nor the defendants had warning of the particular "attack" on July 24, 2003. Accordingly, plaintiff's failure-to-protect claim must fail. Defendants cannot be said to have been deliberately indifferent in failing to protect plaintiff from a potential harm of which they are unaware. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the failure-to-protect claim.
Excessive Force
Defendant Files broke up the fight between plaintiff and the other inmates referenced in the prior claim. In doing so, Files sprayed plaintiff with Mace. Plaintiff claims that Files' action constituted excessive force,
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has concisely set forth the standard to be used in analyzing excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees:
[T]he question in this circuit for suits brought by pretrial detainees alleging excessive use of force in the context of a prison disturbance, is that stated in Hudson [v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)]; whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. The focus of this standard is on the detention facility official's subjective intent to punish. But, in determining such intent, the calculus of the trier of fact must include such objective factors as the extent of injuries suffered, the apparent need for the application of force, the degree of force exerted, the threat reasonably perceived by the detention facility official, and the need to act quickly and decisively.Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1449 (5th Cir. 1993).
In Hudson, the Supreme Court expressly noted that while the malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm is actionable, "[t]hat is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Rather, excluded from constitutional recognition are de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Id. at 9-10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that to support an excessive force claim the plaintiff "must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis physical injury." Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1999).
While both Hudson and Gomez dealt with Eighth Amendment claims brought by convicted inmates, the Fifth Circuit has noted that such cases are equally applicable to Fourteenth Amendment claims brought by pretrial detainees because "it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security." Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1446.
In support of the motion for summary judgment, defendants have submitted a number of affidavits regarding the incident giving rise to this claim. In the affidavit of Deputy Larry Files, he states in pertinent part:
1. That he is a correctional officer with the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office and was so at all times pertinent hereto.
2. That on July 24, 2003, he was in the control room when Deputy Alford notified him of what appeared to be an altercation between inmates Timothy Abrams and Edward McCray in Dorm A.
3. That he immediately responded to Dorm A and found inmate Abram[s] threatening inmate McCray with an empty Coca-Cola crate.
4. That when he told the two inmates to break it up, Abrams swung the crate and struck McCray on the head.
5. That he requested the assistance of another inmate, Rashard Bickham, in subduing Abrams.
6. That Bickham attempted to assist him, but Abrams struck Bickham twice in the face.
7. That Abrams, Bickham and McCray continued to fight.
8. That he gave Abrams, Bickham and McCray three verbal warnings to stop fighting.
9. That when the inmates failed to obey his warnings, he let out a burst of Freeze + P spray.
10. That this initial burst failed to break up the altercation, so he again sprayed all three inmates with a one-second burst of Freeze + P.
11. That at that point, the altercation ended, and he placed Abrams in Holding Cell 264.
Rec. Doc. 14, Exhibit B.
In corroboration, defendants have also submitted an affidavit from Dallas Alford, in which he states in pertinent part:
1. That he is a correctional officer with the Washington Parish Sheriff s Office, and was so at all times pertinent hereto.
2. That on July 24, 2003, he was on duty at the tower.
3. That from said position, he observed an argument between inmates Edward McCray and Timothy Abrams.
4. That, at the time, Abrams was armed with a coke crate.
5. That he radioed the control room to advise them of the situation in Dorm A.
6. That Deputy Files immediately responded to Dorm A.
7. That Abrams struck McCray with the coke crate in Files' presence.
8. That Deputy Files told the inmates to break up the fight several times before spraying them with the Freeze + P.
Rec. Doc. 14, Exhibit A.
Additionally, defendants have submitted from the facility's official records a copy of a statement given by inmate Edward McCray regarding the incident. In that statement, McCray wrote:
On 07-24-2003 Timothy Abrams was upset with the jailers because they wouldn't take him to the hospital. Then he went into his cell and came out with a red crate, and started swinging it at myself and several others.
At this time Deputy Larry D. Files, gave several orders to stop. Timothy Abrams continued swinging the crate on me and Rashard Bickham we were all fighting between the tables. Deputy Files, gave several orders to break the fight up, and catch your cells.
The next thing I know we were all sprayed with mace. All (3) of us. That broke the fight up. Deputy Files, to me took the proper procedures in breaking this fight up. Being the fact that he was the only deputy in the (A-Dorm).
If he hadn't of sprayed the (3) of us with mace Timothy Abrams, would have come out in a lot worser shape than he did.
Rec. Doc. 14, Exhibit D.
In plaintiff's opposition to the motion for summary judgment, he argues that the information in the affidavits and the statement by McCray is false; however, plaintiff offers no evidence in support of those allegations or any evidence regarding his version of the incident. Rather, plaintiff's only competent summary judgment evidence, his verified complaint in which he alleges that he was sprayed by Files in an effort to break up the violent altercation taking place, is in fact consistent with defendants' evidence.
A plaintiff's factual allegations in a verified complaint are competent summary judgment evidence. Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2003).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the use of chemical spray to maintain or restore discipline in a prison setting has been recognized as an appropriate course of action. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Stalden, 137 F.3d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1998). In the instant case, the evidence before this Court shows that Deputy Files used two short bursts of chemical spray to break up a prison fight after the inmates failed to heed verbal commands. Plaintiff has presented no evidence indicating that Deputy Files' actions were taken maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. On the contrary, all of the evidence supports the conclusion that the use of the chemical spray was a good-faith effort to restore discipline.
Additionally, as noted above, the Fifth Circuit requires a "more than de minimis physical injury" to support an excessive force claim. Gomez, 163 F.3d at 924. In the instant case, there is no evidence of any physical injury, de minimis or otherwise, caused by the use of the pepper spray.
While plaintiff contends he was injured by the other inmates in the altercation, he does not contend, much less bring forth evidence to establish, that he was injured by Files' use of the chemical spray.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the excessive force claim.
Medical Care
It is clearly established that the constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee may be violated if his serious medical needs are met with deliberate indifference on the part of penal authorities. See Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001). However, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted:
Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet. . . . [T]he plaintiff must show that officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs. Furthermore, the decision whether to provide additional treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment. And, the failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the official] should have perceived, but did not is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.Domino v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Additionally, while deliberate indifference to medical needs is actionable under § 1983, negligence and medical malpractice are not. "Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law." Baker v. McCollan, 443U.S. 137, 146 (1979). "It is clear that negligent medical treatment is not a cognizable basis upon which to predicate a section 1983 action." Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1993). "Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). In summary, allegations of negligence or malpractice alone are never sufficient to state a claim for constitutionally inadequate medical care. Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693, 697 (5th Cir. 1999).
Moreover, a mere disagreement between an inmate and the medical staff concerning whether certain medical treatment was appropriate generally is not actionable absent exceptional circumstances. Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, mere delay in receiving medical care is insufficient to create § 1983 liability unless harm resulted. See Mendoza, 989 F.2d at 193.
Plaintiff's complaint is, at best, vague regarding his claims of inadequate medical treatment. However, in any event, defendants have submitted copies of plaintiff s medical records from the Washington Parish Jail showing that jail officials were in fact generally quite responsive to plaintiff's requests for medical attention. For example, those records reflect the following events.
On July 6, 2002, plaintiff was examined at the Washington-St. Tammany Regional Medical Center Emergency Room. Plaintiff was placed on a suicide watch and prescribed Cephalxin, Motrin, and a cream for his legs.
Cephalexin is the active ingredient in Keflex, an antibiotic. Physicians' Desk Reference 1230 (57th ed. 2003).
Motrin, or ibuprofen, is a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug prescribed for mild to moderate pain. Id. at 1900-01.
On July 21, 2002, plaintiff was examined at the Washington-St. Tammany Regional Medical Center Emergency Room and prescribed Grifulvin and a cream for a rash.
Grifulvin is an antibiotic prescribed for various fungal infections. Id. at 2445.
On July 30, 2002, plaintiff submitted requests for medical attention, complaining of a rash and blood leaking from his "private [area]." On that same date, plaintiff was again treated at the Washington-St. Tammany Regional Medical Center Emergency Room and prescribed Doxycycline, Grifulvin, Lotrimin, and Atarax.
Doxycycline is the active ingredient in Vibramycin, an antibiotic. Id. at 2656.
Lotrimin is a broad-spectrum antifungal agent used to treat dermal infections. Id. at 3048.
Atarax is prescribed to treat anxiety and tension. Id. at 2577.
On August 7, 2002, plaintiff was examined at the Washington-St. Tammany Regional Medical Center Emergency Room. He was placed under observation and ordered to have a mental health evaluation as soon as possible.
On August 24, 2002, plaintiff was found on the floor complaining that his testicles were swollen and that he could not move. Plaintiff was examined by emergency medical technicians and taken to the hospital. Plaintiff was examined at the Washington-St. Tammany Regional Medical Center Emergency Room and prescribed medications, including ibuprofen.
On September 4, 2002, a physician performed a mental health evaluation of plaintiff because of his history of self-mutilation and auditory hallucinations. The physician placed plaintiff on Remeron and Risperdal for his conditions.
Remeron is prescribed to treat a major depressive disorder.Id. at 2402.
Risperdal is prescribed for the treatment of schizophrenia.Id. at 1787.
On December 12, 2002, plaintiff was taken to the hospital after claiming that he injured himself in a fall. The doctor at the emergency room found that plaintiff had a bruised buttock and prescribed hot packs and Motrin or ibuprofen for pain.
On February 21, 2003, paramedics were called after plaintiff ingested a razor blade. He was transported to the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans where he refused treatment. Plaintiff also refused medical treatment at the Washington Parish Jail on February 21 and 22, 2003.
On March 31, 2003, plaintiff allegedly took an overdose. Paramedics were called to the scene, but plaintiff refused medical treatment.
On July 30, 2003, plaintiff submitted a request for medical attention for a rash. In connection with that request, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Hussain on August 20, 2003.
In addition to those medical records, the affidavit of Deputy Files indicates that plaintiff was given first-aid after the altercation on July 24, 2003. In that affidavit, Files stated:
12. As a result of the altercation, Abrams received a small cut to his head.
13. That he cleansed the small cut with Hydrogen Peroxide and applied a band-aid to Abrams' head.
Rec. Doc. 14, Exhibit B, p. 2.
Plaintiff has brought forward no competent summary judgment evidence demonstrating that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Furthermore, plaintiff's medical records belie his unsupported allegations that he was denied medical care or that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Those records demonstrate that plaintiff was provided with an abundance of medical care, which he even sometimes refused, during the course of his incarceration. For example, paramedics were called numerous times in response to plaintiff's various complaints, and he was taken for emergency room treatment no fewer than seven times.
See Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Medical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an inmate's allegations of deliberate indifference.").
Additionally, to the extent that plaintiff is complaining about his medical care for his injuries from the altercation of July 24, 2003, plaintiff has brought forth no competent summary judgment evidence establishing that his injuries constituted serious medical needs. In his complaint, plaintiff states that he sustained a bloody eye and nose in the altercation. Files' affidavit indicates that plaintiff had a small cut to his head, for which he received immediate first aid. Tellingly, plaintiff's medical records indicate that, in his sole written request for medical attention for injuries sustained in the fight, plaintiff complained only: "right eye swollen running water hurts bad." Those facts, which indicate the minor nature of plaintiff's injuries, along with his failure to present any evidence that his injuries constituted serious medical needs, lead this Court to conclude that plaintiff has failed to establish that the cut on his head and his minor eye injury were serious medical needs. See Martin v. Genfile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988) (small cut with some bleeding was not a serious medical need); see also Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1990) (swollen wrists with some bleeding did not constitute a serious medical need).
Rec. Doc. 14, Exhibit D, Inmate Voluntary Request for Medical Attention dated July 27, 2003. The Court notes that in plaintiffs unverified and unsupported memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, he for the first time indicates that his injuries were more extensive. Rec. Doc. 21, p. 2. Plaintiff has not, however, brought forth any competent summary judgment evidence to establish the existence of those alleged injuries.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claims for inadequate medical care.
Housing with Convicted Inmates
In his complaint, plaintiff states: "Further at least two of the inmates that jumped me were D.O.C. as I am a pretrial detainee I should not have even been on the block with them." The Court construes that statement as a claim that plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated by the defendants' practice of housing pretrial detainees with convicted inmates.
Rec. Doc. 1.
While the practice of housing pretrial detainees with convicted inmates can amount to a constitutional violation, such a practice is not unconstitutional if it is "reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security or physical facilities do not permit their separation." Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (emphasis added), overruled in part on other grounds, International Woodworkers of America, ALF-CIO v. Champion International Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Schwartz v. Jones, Civil Action No. 99-3269, 2001 WL 118600, at *7 (E.D. La. Feb. 9, 2001).
In support of the motion for summary judgment, defendants have submitted an affidavit from Warden Royce McGhee. In that affidavit, McGhee stated:
1. That he is the Warden of the Washington Parish Jail and was so at all times pertinent hereto.
2. That the Washington Parish Jail houses 136 inmates in eight cell blocks.
3. That inmates frequently become involved in feuds which require their immediate separation for purposes of maintaining prison security.
4. That inmates often form gangs that require disbanding and separation for purposes of maintaining prison security.
5. That the ratio of inmates to available cell blocks, combined with the administration's overriding need to keep inmates involved in gangs or ongoing feuds in separate blocks, makes it impossible to separate all pretrial detainees from convicted inmates.
Rec. Doc. 24.
In light of defendants' evidence and plaintiff's failure to bring forth any evidence whatsoever to rebut McGhee's affidavit, the Court finds that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claims regarding inmate housing.
ORDER
It is therefore ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and that plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.