Opinion
March 29, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Becker, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the defendants' decisions to freeze and cut the salaries of certain management/confidential nonunion employees, while agreeing to salary increases for nonmanagerial/confidential union employees, violates the Equal Protection Clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions. Under both the New York State and Federal Constitutions, an equal protection challenge based upon an economic classification, as here, must be judged under a "rational basis" standard (see, New York City Managerial Empls. Assn. v. Dinkins, 807 F. Supp. 958, 964, 965, n 4; Matter of Doe v Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, cert denied 488 U.S. 879; Matter of Abrams v. Bronstein, 33 N.Y.2d 488, 492-493; Matter of Arnold v Constantine, 164 A.D.2d 203, 206; Margolis v. New York City Tr. Auth., 157 A.D.2d 238, 240-241). The rational basis standard has two prongs: (1) the challenged action must have a legitimate purpose and (2) it must have been reasonable for the legislators to believe that the challenged classification would have a fair and substantial relationship to that purpose (see, New York City Managerial Empls. Assn. v. Dinkins, supra, at 965). An economic classification such as the defendants' salary actions will not be set aside if any set of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it (see, New York City Managerial Empls. Assn. v Dinkins, supra, at 965; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426; People v. Ditniak, 28 N.Y.2d 74, 78). Indeed, the defendants' actions are entitled to a presumption of rationality "that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality" (Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-332; see also, Matter of Subway-Surface Supervisors Assn. v. New York City Tr. Auth., 56 A.D.2d 53, 59).
On the record before us, we find that there is a legitimate governmental purpose for the defendants' actions and that there is a rational relationship between the classification and these actions. The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the classifications chosen by the defendants are so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that the court can only conclude that their actions were irrational. A governing body does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect (Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472-473; Matter of Tolub v Evans, 58 N.Y.2d 1, 8).
We further find that the challenged ordinances do not violate Nassau County Charter § 1307 requiring salaries to be standardized "so that, as near as may be, equal pay may be given for equal work [emphasis added]". The general principle of "equal pay for equal work" need not be applied in all circumstances (see, Matter of Shattenkirk v. Finnerty, 97 A.D.2d 51, 56, affd 62 N.Y.2d 949; accord, Matter of Altruda v Forsythe, 184 A.D.2d 881, 883; Matter of Arnold v. Constantine, 164 A.D.2d 203, 206-207, supra).
We have considered the plaintiffs' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit (see, Cook v. City of Binghamton, 48 N.Y.2d 323, 329-330). Balletta, J.P., Thompson, Lawrence and Goldstein, JJ., concur.