Opinion
CASE NO. C14-1160JLR
04-12-2017
A. H. LUNDBERG ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. TSI, INC., Defendant.
ORDER
This order clarifies the court's reasoning for declining to award prejudgment interest to Plaintiffs A. H. Lundberg Associates, Inc., and Lundberg, LLC (collectively, "Lundberg"). (See Judgment (Dkt. # 287).) Pursuant to the court's March 30, 2017, order (3/30/17 Order (Dkt. # 281) at 1), Lundberg and Defendant TSI, Inc., submitted proposed judgments for the court's consideration (see Lundberg Prop. Judgment (Dkt. # 283); TSI Prop. Judgment (Dkt # 286)). The parties' proposed judgments were materially identical with one exception: Lundberg asserted that it was entitled to prejudgment interest from the date the jury rendered its verdict until the court entered judgment (Lundberg Prop. Judgment at 2-3), and TSI disagreed (TSI Prop. Judgment; TSI Resp. (Dkt. # 285)).
The court concluded that Lundberg is not entitled to prejudgment interest. (See Judgment (entering TSI's proposed judgment).) Lundberg asked the court to treat the jury's verdict as a liquidated amount and therefore entitled to prejudgment interest. (See Lundberg Prop. Judgment at 2-3.) Lundberg relies on Hadley v. Maxwell, 84 P.3d 286 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), to support its position. In Hadley, the plaintiffs prevailed at trial, the defendant appealed only the jury's liability finding, the Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial only on liability, and the plaintiff again prevailed at trial and recovered the initial jury's damages award. Id. at 289-90. The Washington Court of Appeals treated the initial jury's damages award, which the defendant never challenged, as a liquidated sum for purposes of awarding prejudgment interest. Id. at 290.
Based on the unique circumstances of Hadley, this court concluded that Hadley does not extend to this case. Here, Lundberg and TSI have merely engaged in typical post-trial motions practice. (See Dkt.) Furthermore, unlike the defendant in Hadley, TSI challenged the jury's damages finding. (See JMOL Mot. (Dkt. # 228) at 13-19); see also Coulter v. Asten Grp., Inc., 230 P.3d 169, 174 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (declining to award prejudgment interest because "[u]nlike Hadley, where the resolution was merely a question of apportionment, here there is some uncertainty as to the damages" the plaintiff would receive from the defendant). Accordingly, the court concluded that the verdict is not a liquidated amount and Lundberg is not entitled to prejudgment interest thereon. Because the parties' proposed judgments were identical in all other material ways, the court entered TSI's proposed judgment. (See Judgment.)
Dated this 12th day of April, 2017.
/s/_________
JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge
See also In re Exxon Valdez, 484 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that federal courts sitting in diversity apply state law to calculate prejudgment interest); TJ Landco, LLC v. Harley C. Douglass, Inc., 346 P.3d 777, 780 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) ("A party is entitled to prejudgment interest on liquidated claims . . . . Trial courts may exercise discretion in the amount of the award, but must give a reasonable explanation in equity for any deviance from the standard rate."); Lakes v. von der Mehden, 70 P.3d 154, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) ("[Prejudgment] interest is awardable (1) when the amount claimed is liquidated, or (2) when the amount claimed is unliquidated but is determinable by computation with reference to a fixed standard in a contract.").