Opinion
April 23, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Huff, J.).
The IAS Court properly converted the motion to one for summary judgment without notice to the non-State defendants, because the action involves no issues of material fact, but only issues of law fully appreciated and argued by both sides, specifically the constitutionality of chapter 473 (see, Four Seasons Hotels v Vinnik, 127 A.D.2d 310, 320). The purported issues of fact raised by the appellants are largely de hors the record, and, in any event, legally immaterial to the constitutionality of chapter 473.
We agree with the IAS Court's constitutional analysis to the following extent. The act violates the plaintiffs' right to due process by abrogating a fixed and unreviewable judgment through later legislation (Short v. Thygiesen, 54 A.D.2d 1082). Moreover, plaintiffs' right to equal protection under the law is violated by the imposition of a classification whose relationship to the asserted goal of reducing the housing shortage is so attenuated as to render the relevant distinction arbitrary or irrational (City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432). The act also grants the tenant-defendants an exclusive privilege to remain in apartments in violation of N.Y. Constitution, article III, § 17, and functions as an improper regulatory taking without compensation, since it denies the owners the economic value of their property and fails to advance substantially a legitimate State interest (Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 107, cert denied 493 U.S. 976). Finally, the act impairs plaintiffs' right to the consent judgment — a contract — without serving a public end by means reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end without being arbitrary or oppressive (Matter of Subway-Surface Supervisors Assn. v. New York City Tr. Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 101). Since any one of these grounds will support the relief that the plaintiffs seek, that relief was properly granted.
The IAS Court erred in concluding that chapter 473, which has the effect of invalidating a consent judgment between the plaintiffs herein and the State, is unconstitutional for lack of a "home rule message" pursuant to N.Y. Constitution, article IX, § 2 (b) (2). Even though this is a special law in that it applies only to the tenant-defendants herein (see, Matter of Radich v Council of City of Lackawanna, 93 A.D.2d 559, affd 61 N.Y.2d 652), a special law does not require a home rule message where it deals with a matter of statewide concern (Pero v. City of Batavia, 99 A.D.2d 668, affd 63 N.Y.2d 971), such as housing (Spring Realty Co. v. New York City Loft Bd., 69 N.Y.2d 657, appeal dismissed 482 U.S. 911). Chapter 473 is not a physical taking of property without just compensation, because it does not impose on the plaintiffs new tenants not already in occupancy (cf., Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, supra). It is not a bill of attainder, because its primary purpose is not to punish the plaintiffs (see, Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425). It does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers, which prevents one branch of the government from usurping another's legitimate power to act (Boreali v. Axelrod, 130 A.D.2d 107, affd 71 N.Y.2d 1), since the judiciary branch would not have the power to invalidate the consent judgment.
Concur — Carro, J.P., Milonas, Ellerin, Smith and Rubin, JJ.